# Hiding in Plain Sight?

## A Nationwide Study of the Use of Identity Manipulation by Registered Sex Offenders

Center for Identity Management and Information Protection (CIMIP)
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# About CIMIP

The Center for Identity Management and Information Protection (CIMIP) at Utica College is a research collaborative dedicated to furthering a national research agenda on identity management, information sharing, and data protection.  Founded in June 2006, its ultimate goal is to impact policy, regulation, and legislation, working toward a more secure homeland. CIMIP's advisory board is committed to working together to provide resources, gather subject-matter experts, and provide access to sensitive data to produce actionable results. CIMIP's objectives are to assist the community solve the growing problems of identity theft and fraud, secure sharing of information, and information protection by creating best practices, new policies, regulations, legislation, training opportunities, and proactive initiatives. CIMIP's advisory board consists of the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Marshals Service, Florida Highway Patrol, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, ID Analytics, Document Security Systems, Tascet, Aveksa, Strategic Information Resources, Coalition for a Secure Driver's License, Triad Biometrics, University of Alabama at Birmingham, University of Massachusetts at Lowell, and University of Texas at Dallas.  To learn more about CIMIP, visit www.cimip.org

# Table of Contents

# Executive Summary

The original purpose of this study was to address empirically the problem of the obfuscation of identities by registered sex offenders to avoid the sex offender register tracking systems. The project focused on: 1) the scope of this problem; 2) the ability to identify offenders who have successfully manipulated their identities to avoid sex offender register tracking systems; 3) the identification of the common methods used to hide their identities; and 4) the development of a "warning" system to determine if a certain sex offenders are at risk to manipulate their identities based on predicting factors.

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) estimated in 2012 that there were over 700, 000 registered sex offenders in the United States and its territories (The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2012). Additionally, NCMEC estimated that there are 100,000 sex offenders that fail to register when required to under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which is under Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Horst, 2007).

For the purposes of this study, the National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) database maintained through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was obtained and analyzed. A survey was also conducted of law enforcement agencies throughout the United States that are in charge of registration and enforcement of the sex offender registration systems in their jurisdictions. Site visits were also performed, which included interviews of subject matter experts relative to the registration, tracking and enforcement of sex offenders who were currently in compliance of laws and those who have absconded.

In Chapter 1, we outline the nature and extent of the problem of sex offender identity manipulation. We also describe our research approach and outline several research questions to be answered in the following chapters. Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of U.S. sex offender legislation beginning in 1994 and ending in 2006. This legislative background describes the various requirements recent laws have imposed on states and sex offenders. Chapters 3–8 discuss our research strategies and findings, more detail about which is provided in the subsection below. Chapter 9 summarizes the key findings from our study and suggests how future research could advance knowledge on identity manipulation by sex offenders.

## Findings

We began by assessing the implementation of SORNA across the United States. Results presented in Chapter 3 revealed that state or local police are the most common agencies charged with registering sex offenders. All states collect the minimum information required by SORNA (e.g., name and aliases, date of birth, residence, physical location). Nearly all states collect professional license

information, school information, text of registration offense, and criminal history information.  SORNA also requires states to make public information about sex offenders.  Over four-fifths of states maintain an on-line listing of all sex offenders, while less than two-thirds of states maintain a public web site listing sex offender absconders.

We conducted several state site visits in an attempt to fully understand how states address SORNA requirements and their experiences with identity theft and identity manipulation by offenders.  This qualitative component, discussed in Chapter 4, revealed a variety of difficulties associated with tracking sex offenders and addressing occurrences of identity theft and identity manipulation among registered sex offenders. By state, the main findings were as follows:

Florida - According to the Florida detectives interviewed, the majority of the sex offenders that do abscond do so to the homes of relatives or friends. Cases that had been seen of sex offender identity manipulation were typically characterized by the use of aliases by the sex offenders Interviewees noted that a requirement in Florida is the marking of drivers' licenses with a stamp identifying that person as a sex offender or predator. Many offenders were said to be guilty of altering or cutting this mark off to keep police officers from being alerted to the fact that they are on the sex registry if stopped for other offenses.

Ohio - In Ohio, those interviewed reported a 2% to 10% range of absconding. Officers reported having seen cases in which the family and friends help hide offenders "in plain sight" through the use of their homes. In general, county sheriff officers interviewed in Ohio had experienced cases in which sex offenders would "tinker" with their addresses.  For example, a sex offender may register an address but may spend more time at the girlfriend's house which might be located across town.

Oklahoma - Those interviewed in Oklahoma reported instances of offenders moving to other states or counties to avoid registering, obtaining utility bills in the names of their children and using the children's social security numbers as their own. They also reported cases in which offenders would register as being homeless even if they are not.  The use of false names or variation of the offenders' name was reported as being very common as a form of identity manipulation.

Texas - In Texas, According to the Director of the Sex Offender Registration system, about 12% of the  active cases on the system were in noncompliance; in a significant number of these noncompliance cases, system errors—not offender non-compliance—were the problem.  In terms of identity manipulation, aliases were said to often be used by sex offenders to avoid detection during potential police stops.

Connecticut - In Connecticut,  about 8% of the registered sex offenders in Connecticut were listed as noncompliant; the majority of those  mailing in an inaccurate address verification to the  state Sex Offender Registry Unit . Those interviewed stated that in many

cases they believe the verification letter is sent to a friend or family residence, and then forwarded on to the offender where it will be completed

We then conducted a national survey of subject-matter experts on existing strategies used to track and report on registered sex offender levels of noncompliance with regulations and the extent and characteristics of identity theft and identity manipulation. These results are presented in Chapter 5. More than 200 agencies representing 46 states participated. The majority of agencies have designated monitoring, apprehension, data management, and identification functions; however, relatively few agencies have a designated tiering function. Major findings of the survey included:

Nearly 4% of registered sex offenders were said to be noncompliant with sex offender registration regulations ($n = 3,310$).

The factor most commonly contributing to registration noncompliance is an attitude of "indifference" to requirements. "Rebellion" against requirements was the next most common factor leading to registration noncompliance. Moving to another residency location within the state was seen as the most common precipitating factor associated with noncompliance.

Special apprehension units and the U.S. Marshall's Service were the resources used the most, to apprehend absconders.

Concerning identity theft and identity manipulation, 22 agencies reported that approximately 1% of registered sex offenders were known to use identity manipulation to avoid detection, and 21 agencies reported that 1–5% of registered sex offenders do so in their jurisdictions.

Respondents indicated that sex offenders use a variety of forms of false identifying information, such as false or different names, social security numbers, or dates of birth. Such information would commonly be stolen from someone the sex offender knows; co-workers, roommates, friends, and family members.

 The most common role played by individuals within these agencies is in registration compliance. It is most common for individuals to perform four of these functions. Combined, participating agencies are charged with monitoring 89,015 registered sex offenders, which is more than 10% of the national population of registered sex offenders. On average, agencies are responsible for monitoring

397 sex offenders with three full-time equivalent officers dedicated to this task. In-person interviews and unannounced field visits were found to be the most common verification and monitoring methods.

Criminal history information and driver's license/RMV data files are the most common forms of data technology used to locate and apprehend missing and absconded offenders. Follow-up questions indicate that respondents believe these to be the two most effective methods for locating offenders. Last known address visits and probation/parole consultants are the most commonly employed contact-based approaches to locating missing offenders. It is most common for agencies to use both data technology and contact-based approaches to locating offenders.

Chapter 6 further explored the problem of missing sex offenders. Federal NSOR data indicated that the southern region of the United States has the highest number of absconders. The examination of this data included the presence of multiple social security numbers held by individual registered sex offenders. Most of the statistics for multiple social security numbers remained close to the national average, and appeared to be unremarkable. However, it should be noted that 10,460 of the registered sex offenders had 3 or more social security numbers, serving as an indication of possible identity manipulation.

We shifted focus from missing sex offenders to sex offenders who manipulate their identity in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 reported that about 42% of offenders in the NSOR dataset have multiple identity elements, such as more than one name, social security number, or date of birth. A sex offender (SO) score was calculated to express the likelihood that a sex offender had manipulated his/her identity and likely is noncompliant with registration requirements. More than 16% of sex offenders had a high SO score, which indicated that they appeared to be manipulating their identities. Louisiana exhibited the highest percentage of registered sex offenders who appeared to be manipulating their identities, while Wisconsin exhibited the lowest percentage of registered sex offenders who appeared to be manipulating their identities.

In Chapter 8, a subsample of offenders from Florida was closely examined to "validate" the sex offender manipulation scoring model using state level data from the state sex offender registry. The validation study revealed that many of the sampled cases were false alarms due to old data. However, more than 18% of the sampled cases involved identity manipulation—either name- or SSN-based. The predictive value of the model for "high risk" offenders was found to be at 36%. Chapter 8 explains how the model can be used to enhance its abilities as an "alert" vehicle, rather than as a pure predictive instrument, to alert sex offender registration/monitoring agencies to the "red flags" of identity manipulation that could serve as the basis for further investigation to either identity precursors to the act of absconding, or to actual identity manipulation as a part of absconding. Chapter 9 ties the full report together by summarizing key points, drawing conclusions and proposing recommendations for improving important elements of the sex offender registration/monitoring systems in the U.S. The chapter also proposes recommendations for the enhancement of the accuracy and integrity of database systems that house sex offender characteristic data.

## Recommendations

Based upon study findings, it is clear that while the percentage of possible identity manipulation incidents by registered sex offenders to avoid monitoring is in the minority, it is still an area of concern. Given the sheer volume of registered sex offenders throughout the U.S., it is likely that tens of thousands of sex offenders try to "fly under the radar" by employing simple methods to avoid effective tracking. In some cases, they take advantage of cracks in the system to alter their identities. In others, they capitalize on their own creativity to reinvent themselves in the eyes of society. It is reasonable to conclude that, according to subject matter experts interviewed, feelings of indifference to registration and outright resistance to the registration system can play parts in facilitating subversion activities by offenders. Some law enforcers interviewed for this study even expressed a degree of empathy for those facing hurdles represented by strict residency regulations placed upon the offenders. Nevertheless, sex offender registration and tracking systems are based upon the concept that the official locations of sex offender residences are accurately tracked and reflected in state databases as information sources for the general public. For the system to work, it is necessary for information on offenders to be up-to-date and accurate. While official "absconders" are known to officials responsible for tracking, those who manipulate their identities are often not known to authorities and are not residing in their "official" residence, defeating a primary purpose of the registration system; effective awareness.

Given these findings, we recommend a new approach. As presented in Chapter 8 of this research report, we offer an alternative for those who monitor registered sex offenders. Rather than use a risk scoring system that differentiates high- from low-risk for identity manipulation, it is recommended that monitoring agencies consider developing and testing a continuous notification system more like a credit monitoring report for all registered sex offenders, thus supplying an "alert" system of those showing signs of possible identity manipulation. Such a sex offender identity manipulation notification system could have applications to other offender groups that might be involved in identity manipulation, such as pretrial releases, probationers, and parolees. Future research efforts along these lines might want to consider both the necessity and cost-effectiveness of real-time monitoring of sex offender behavior in the community.

Additional recommendations regarding future research using the NSOR database include:

- Separate the functions of enforcement and awareness. Monitor the individual that has been identified as the one to focus on.
- Use identity-scoring technology to detect and monitor offender non-compliance and identity manipulation risk and send alerts to local jurisdictions.
    - Validate the Sex Offender Score by examining cases beginning from the highest scores.
    - Score offenders monthly and notify local jurisdictions of cases identity manipulation.

- Focus on multi-jurisdictional solutions to enable crossing state lines for enforcement.
- As best as possible, identify and retain the original and true birth name, date of birth and Social Security numbers for all sex offenders on the NSOR file.
- Create single, common, persistent identity keys for all sex offenders for the ability to track the offender.
- Make it less onerous on states to participate by focusing on collecting and labeling key identity elements.
- Address problems in the data and data processes, such as:
  - Focus on key data fields, such as "current status" of the offender, and ensure they are completed properly and edited to ensure accuracy.
  - Initially capture "ground truth" original, true identity characteristics.
  - Use modern database and time stamp technology to store data.
  - Do not overwrite key fields (address, phone…), but rather, retain the history with time stamps.
  - Verify data accuracy and completeness on a field-by-field basis.
  - Capture identity and status changes in a timely manner.
  - Archive deported deceased, expired and "suppressed" records.
  - Remove duplicate and redundant identities.
- Conduct further research on areas such as cross state moving and sex offender score validation

# Chapter 1
# Introduction

In 2006, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) enacted under Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 established stricter minimal standards for sex offender registration and notification in the United States. This was done by identifying and closing loopholes that previously had been seen under sex offender legislation that was not uniform throughout the United States. Furthermore, SORNA implements more stringent minimal standards that national sex offender registration networks and notification programs must adhere to.

SORNA requires sex offenders to provide more extensive registration information that includes but is not limited to:
- Sex offender's name and aliases.
- Residence address. If the sex offender does not have a permanent address, then the information regarding the primary location must be provided.
- Address of the sex offender's place of employment, including information about where the sex offender works if no permanent address of employment is provided.
- Address of the place where the sex offender is or will be a student.
- License plate number and description of any vehicle owned or operated by the sex offender.
- A physical description of the sex offender.
- The text of the registered sex offenses committed by the offender and any other sex offense for which the offender has been convicted.
- A current photograph of the sex offender.

With the tighter structure of registration, many offenders have failed to register or have "fallen through the cracks" to avoid the strict registration standards. In recent years, a variety of factors (e.g., community notification, residency restrictions, life-time supervision) appear to have resulted in a significant number of offenders violating registration as required under SORNA. This can occur at any time for convicted sex offenders, ranging from failing to register when convicted or, failing to notify proper authorities when they move from one jurisdiction to another.

The idea for this study was originated with the analysis of the "absconder/failure to report" data, which revealed that the statistics of those offenders who fail to register varies significantly from 50,000 to 100,000 while some do question these estimates (Harris, 2007; Levinson and Harris, 2012). There was a growing concern based on these differing statistics that offenders are using methods to manipulate their identities and construct new identities to evade authorities. Until this study, there was no research into the estimated number of offenders who use identity manipulation to evade tracking under the current laws.

This project was developed in conjunction with advisory board member ID Analytics and is based on the hypothesis that "lost" sexual offenders manipulate their identifying information to go undetected by law enforcement to "hide in plain sight." The project was developed with the intention to study what methods the "lost" offenders are employing to evade the registration requirements and to offer solutions to the problem.

## Foundation of the Issue

The foundation of the present study was based on the on the premise that sex offenders have the propensity to manipulate personal identities in an effort to avoid registry monitoring and tracking under state and federal laws. This project was dedicated to the analysis of the scope of this problem and the identification of offenders who have manipulated their identities successfully and the most common methods employed to hide their identities. Research has been limited in this area of the criminal justice system. Evidence of sex offenders using stolen identities is prevalent. Cases have been occurring and covered by the media within the last several years, including:

- The 2006 conviction of convicted sex offender Bradford Storti of Rock, Michigan, who falsely assumed the identity of John Slapp (an infant from Rock who had died in 1972) to move to Oregon without having to register as a sex offender (Hills, 2006).
- In another similar case, 53-year-old former girls basketball coach Anthony D. Giles was alleged to be using the identity of a deceased infant as early as 1990. He originally was sentenced in 2003 to a prison term and was required to register as a sex offender in Seattle, Washington (Radford, 2013).
- Mark Robinson had been a wanted man since 2008. He was pulled over for a drunken driving offense on December 4, 2010, in Richmond, Kentucky, at which point he presented a valid driver's license and social security card in the name of Peter Overly. He had stolen the identity in 2008 to avoid the Kentucky state sex offender registry (Spencer, 2010).
- Maxie Moore, 54, was sentenced to 4 years in prison in May 2010 for using the identity information of a fellow prison inmate at the SeaTac Federal Detention Center to avoid sex offender registration. Moore served the prison sentence at SeaTac for using his dead son's social security number to open bank accounts and obtain benefits in 1999 (Rodriquez, 2010).
- Police in Lawton, Oklahoma arrested a convicted sex offender who was wanted for violating parole in New York. Officials learned that Peter Green was wanted on a parole violation and he was classified as a sexually violent offender and

predicate sex offender. Green was convicted in 2011 for first-degree sexual abuse after prosecutors say he had sexual contact with a victim who was under the age of 11-years-old. Investigators learned that Green was using the identity of Damel Burton (Querry, 2013).

One of the most notorious cases of sex offender identity manipulation took place in El Mirage, Arizona where a supposed "grandfather", a "father", a "12-year-old son" and a "cousin" resided in a three bedroom house. The supposed twelve-year-old went by the name of Casey Price, and he was enrolled in seventh grade at the nearby middle school. This "Price family" turned out not to be a typical family. "Casey" was actually 29-year-old Neil Rodreick, a convicted sex offender from Oklahoma. He was discovered when school administrators noticed "Casey's" German birth certificate listed his height in centimeters and weight in pounds. Subsequently, school administrators discovered they'd been given bogus documents. Criminal investigators called into the case found that the charade started years earlier when Rodreick met Brian Nellis, also a convicted sex offender. Nellis represented himself as Rodreick's uncle, registering him for school with the forged documents. They had previously lived together in Oklahoma, failing to register under the state sex offender tracking system. Both befriended two other sex offenders who lived together in Arizona over the Internet. Robert Snow, who eventually represented himself as Rodreicks "father," and Lonnie Stiffler, who played the "grandfather," brought the two from Oklahoma to live with them as a family. Rodreick even fooled Snow and Stiffler into believing he was twelve, and had sex on a regular basis with him. Investigators discovered that not only were none of them using their real names, none of them were registered under the state mandated sex offender tracking system for Arizona. They were all charged with conspiracy to commit fraud and conspiracy to commit forgery. Rodreick, Snow and Nellis were charged with failing to register as sex offenders in the state of Arizona. Rodreick was eventually sentenced to 70 years in incarceration. Nellis was sentenced to 51 years, Snow to 22 years and Stiffler to 14 years (Steinhauer, 2007).

This anecdotal evidence on identity manipulation by sex offenders indicates there is a need for further, empirical research on sex offender identity manipulation. With sex offender laws and tracking in flux, such cases as these might indicate a growing area for identity manipulation by offenders to bypass registration laws.

## The Empirical Approach

This study was designed to assess the nature and extent of identity manipulation by registered sex offenders. Identity manipulation is a means by which sex offenders released from prison might evade law enforcement and represent a threat to public safety. In particular, this study had three short-term goals:

1. Determine the national size, scope, and key characteristics of the manipulation by sex offenders;
2. Determine if there is a pattern based on the size of the data of offenders who have manipulated their identity successfully; and

3. Develop a model for predicting the level of risk of sex offenders believed to engage in identity manipulation.

In addition, this study had three long-term goals:
1. Reduce the amount of sex offender identity obfuscation;
2. Create effective means of locating absconders; and
3. Predict the risk of obfuscation.

The main issue to be investigated in this study was how frequently sex offenders are using identity manipulation to avoid having to register or being tracked and discovered by law enforcement. To address this issue, we asked a series of research questions:

- How do sex offenders avoid detection?
- Is there evidence that sex offenders use identity manipulation techniques to avoid authorities?
- How many of these violators eventually are located by law enforcement?
- What are the common strategies being employed by authorities to locate "missing" offenders?
- What new strategies are being developed to locate missing offenders?
- Can the public and private sectors cooperate to develop data sets and predictive models using current available records, such as missing person's information, to develop links between those offenders who use identity theft and those who fail to register or who abscond
- Can new techniques be used to locate sex offenders?
- Can a model be developed to predict both the new identity and current location of the sex offender?

To answer these questions, we began by examining publicly available information about each state's level of implementation with national sex offender registration and notification requirements. We then conducted a nationwide survey of law-enforcement officials involved with sex offender registration, monitoring, and/or location. Another component of this study involved site visits and interviews with subject-matter experts to discuss the registration, monitoring, and absconder location process.

Additionally, we analyzed data from the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) database of sex offenders to develop estimates of the extent and nature of the missing sex offender population, to examine missing sex offender locations and to identify the factors that distinguish compliant from noncompliant sex offenders. And, finally, we constructed and validated a new technique for identifying registered sex offenders who have manipulated their identities and for locating missing sex offenders.

The value of this study lies in its potential to ensure public safety.  In particular, identity manipulation by sex offenders can lead to: a false sense of security by the public, inaccurate "reading" of who sex offenders are, and potential negative perceptions of tracking systems when manipulation is brought to light.  For these reasons, we need to be able to:

- Estimate the extent of the missing sex offender problem;
- Identify the strategies used by sex offenders to avoid apprehension; and
- Identify promising strategies for maximizing compliance and locating missing sex offenders.

# Chapter 2
# Legislative Background

The Jacob Wetterling Act was enacted in 1994 and required sex offenders convicted of sex crimes against children to register with the state.  In 1996, Megan's Law was enacted, which required law enforcement authorities to make information available to the public regarding registered sex offenders at the state level.  Thus, Megan's Law was the first major step in requiring community notification and making offender information available to the public.  Compared with the Wetterling Act, Megan's Law required more information, including the offender's name, picture, address, incarceration date, and nature of the crime.

Signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2006, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act required all sex offenders to be registered and for their information to be made available to the public in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, federal Indian tribes, Guam, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.  Even more information was required under this new law, such as DNA, temporary addresses, and e-mail addresses.  And the Adam Walsh Act set forth stringent requirements as to the reporting of this information by the offender under Title I, known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification act (SORNA).

SORNA closed loopholes in previous sex offender registration laws by both establishing accountability for those who maintain the registry and enforcement and increasing sanctions for offenders who violate sex offender registration laws.  It created time limits to register, outlined sanctions for failure to register, and established guidelines for compliance by states.  Moreover, the law has affected states, local, and tribal law-enforcement agencies by establishing a uniform set of standards for each entity charged with the registration and enforcement of sex offender reporting.  To accomplish such standardization, SORNA established a three-tier classification system for sex offenders based on the severity of offenses committed.

Tier I classification includes sex offenders sentenced to prison for less than one year and whose offenses include receiving or possessing child pornography, sex trafficking, coercion to engage in prostitution, traveling with the intent to engage in illicit conduct, transmitting information about a minor to further sexual conduct, attempted sex, or sexual contact offenses not included in Tiers II or III.  This classification also includes tribal court sex offense convictions, as federal law does not permit incarceration for more than 1 year based on Indian tribal court convictions.

Tier II classification includes sex offenders whose imprisonment time exceeds 1 year.  This includes recidivists who had been classified previously in Tier I.  Tier II offenses consist of the use of a person under age 18 for sexual purposes, including attempts to, conspiracies to, and solicitations or a minor for the purpose of prostitution; sexual abuse; sexual exploitation; selling or buying minors; production and distribution of child pornography; and transportation of minors to engage in illicit conduct.

Tier III classification includes sex offenders whose imprisonment time exceeds 1 year as well as sex offender recidivists who had been classified previously in Tier II.  Tier III offenses consist of the use of a person under age 13 for sexual purposes including attempts or conspiracies to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse by force or threat; committing sexual acts with someone rendered unconscious, involuntarily drugged, or incapable of evaluating the nature of the act; and non-parental kidnapping of a minor.

For a jurisdiction to be in compliance, convictions must translate into SORNA's three-tier classification system such that the following aspects meet or exceed SORNA's requirements:  length of registration, frequency with which the sex offender must verify personally his or her registration information, and amount of information disclosed.  States that meet or exceed SORNA's requirements are considered in good standing, while states who do not meet SORNA's requirements face a 10% funding reduction.

Several agencies are responsible for administering SORNA.  At the federal level are the following organizations:

- The FBI's National Sex Offender Registry—which is part of the National Crime Information Center—provides law-enforcement agencies with information around-the-clock, such as record histories and missing person's records.
- The Office of Justice Programs has the office of Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART).  SMART provides state, tribal, local, and public and private agencies with technical assistance in the implementation of the Walsh Act.
- The U.S. Marshalls Service is the lead federal agency for investigating non-compliant and fugitive sex offenders and for assisting states with enforcing their registration requirements.
- A sector of the Department of Justice implements the National Sex Offender Public Web site, which is a coordinated effort to supply information about registered sex offenders.
- The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children provides a national clearinghouse program and offers the Sex Offender Tracking Team to assist law enforcement in locating and apprehending missing sex offenders.

State requirements vary.

There are no separate federal registration requirements for federal and military sex offenders.  These sex offenders are integrated into the sex offender registration program of the states in which the individuals intend to reside.  Federal and military correctional officials inform the offender verbally and in written form of SORNA requirements; they also notify law enforcement and registration

authorities receiving offenders before imprisonment release that such individuals intend to live there, and they send the sex offender's personal information to receiving agencies.  Federal and military sex offenders must register in person within 3 business days of release from prison.

Regarding foreign sex offenders, SORNA's section 128 requires that jurisdictions register a sex offender entering the United States after being notified by federal authorities that a sex offender entering the United States has the intention to live in a U.S. jurisdiction.  These sex offenders are required to register in person within 3 business days of entering the jurisdiction in which they intend to live.

All jurisdictions were required to implement SORNA minimum national standards by July 27, 2009.  The SMART Office is responsible for determining whether a jurisdiction has implemented SORNA requirements substantially.  Failure to comply results in a jurisdiction losing 10% of its federal Byrne Justice Assistance Grants.  If an Indian tribe fails to implement SORNA standards on its own, registration and notification functions automatically are turned over the state in which its land is located.

# Chapter 3
# Implementation of SORNA

Using publicly available information from 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, we examined states' progress in implementing SORNA requirements.  This analysis is based on SORNA's minimum required standards as a means of determining methods currently used to keep track of sex offenders' registration and notification systems before release from prison and what types of information are being collected and made publicly available by states.  Although the Adam Walsh Act includes Indian tribes and U.S. territories, information from these jurisdictions has not been added to the on-line national sex offender register; for this reason, Indian tribes and U.S. territories are not included in these analyses.

This section presents the results to survey questions about how responding agencies have met (or have not been able to meet) the various SORNA requirements.  Although all sex offenders are given verbal and written notification of their duty to register as sex offenders, 62% of states do not meet SORNA's requirement that sex offenders be registered before being released from prison.  Of the states that do not require sex offenders to register before release, 65% require offenders to register within 3 days of release, 32% require sex offenders to register within 5–10 days of release, and 2% of states give offenders longer than 10 days post-release to register.

Figure 3.1 shows the results of an analysis of the agencies with which sex offenders must register.  State or local police is the most common response (87%), followed by Department of Public Safety (11%), and then Department of Corrections (4%).

Although SORNA does not require the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to track sex offenders, we analyzed whether states' DMVs help monitor sex offenders by requiring them to carry an ID.  Table 3.1 presents the results to three questions about sex offender ID requirements. We collected this information because of its potential value.  That is, the DMV could be a useful agency in enhancing sex offender monitoring and encouraging registration.  For instance, if a sex offender moves to another jurisdiction— without notifying law enforcement as required by SORNA—and applies for a driver's license from that state, then the DMV could alert the proper authorities of the individual's whereabouts, thereby encouraging registration in the new state as a prerequisite for obtaining a driver's license or other form of ID.

SORNA requires that Tier I sex offenders annually do an in-person verification of their information, including updating information and taking a photograph.  Most states comply with (79%) or exceed this requirement.  Thirteen percent of states require this every 6

months, while 4% of states require this every 3 months and 2% of states require this on a quarterly basis. Two percent of states require this every 5 years. Tier II sex offenders are required to submit to a semi-annual in-person verification of their information, to which 15% of states comply and 6% of states exceed. Most states (77%) require this on an annual basis. Two percent of states require this every 5 years. SORNA requires that Tier III sex offenders perform in-person verification every 3 months. Most states (81%) comply with and another 8% of states exceed this requirement by requiring Tier III sex offenders to submit to in-person verification every 6 months. Ten percent of states require this on an annual basis, and 2% of states require this every 5 years.



**Figure 3.1. Agency Responsible for Registering Sex Offenders**

| Table 3.1. Sex Offender ID Requirements | |
|---|---|
| Requirement | % of States with This Requirement |
| Upon registration, sex offenders are required to carry ID card or license | 19 |
| Distinguishable mark placed on ID identifying people as sex offenders* | 17 |
| Registry verification performed before ID is issued | 6 |
| * 2% of states (*n* = 1) require this only for Tier III habitual or aggravated sex offenders. | |

Section 115(A) of SORNA specifies the minimum required duration that sex offenders must be maintained in the registry. Throughout this time, sex offenders are required to keep their information current. There is a 15-year registration period for Tier I sex offenders, to which 67% of states do not comply by having a 10-year registration period. Twenty-one percent of states comply with this requirement, while another 12% of states exceed this requirement by having Tier I sex offenders registered for 20 years (4%) or life (2%). Eight percent of states meet or exceed SORNA's requirement for a 25-year registration period for Tier II sex offenders, while 60% of states require a 10-year registration period, 17% have a 15-year registration period, and 8% have a 20-year registration period. One-hundred percent of states, on the other hand, comply with the requirement that Tier III sex offenders be registered for life.

Another 73% of states comply with SORNA's requirement that failure to register as a sex offender is considered a state felony. Among the 27% of states that do not comply with this requirement, a wide variety of penalties is used (e.g., misdemeanors, up to 3 months incarceration, fines). That over a quarter of states do not comply with this requirement might be considered problematic, as one goal of the Walsh Act was to increase sanctions for violations as a means of reducing the number of sex offenders who evade registration laws.

Section 114 specifies the minimum required information that sex offenders must provide when registering. We found that all states gather the following forms of information:
- Name and aliases;
- Date of birth;
- Current photograph;
- Social security number;
- Residence, lodging, and addresses;

23

- Physical description;
- Fingerprints and palm prints; and
- Employer name and address.

Table 3.2 shows how many states collect other forms of information required by SORNA. Certain types of information are collected by nearly all states: professional licenses, school information, text of registration offense, and criminal history. Telephone numbers are collected by only 13% of states, while Internet identifiers are collected by 23% of states, DNA information is collected by 42% of states, and vehicle information is collected by 54% of states.

| Table 3.2.  Forms of Information Collected by States | |
|---|---|
| **Type of Information** | **Percent of States Collecting It** |
| Telephone numbers | 13 |
| Internet identifiers | 23 |
| DNA | 42 |
| Professional licenses | 98 |
| School information | 98 |
| Vehicle information | 54 |
| Text of registration offense | 98 |
| Criminal history | 98 |

Table 3.3 shows the frequency with which three other SORNA requirements are met regarding making public information about registered sex offenders.  It is most common for states to maintain on the Internet a list of Tier II and Tier III offenders only (85%), followed closely by an on-line listing of all sex offenders (83%).  It is least common for states to maintain a public web site containing a list of all sex offender absconders (60%).

| Table 3.3.  Information Maintained on the Internet by States | |
| --- | --- |
| **Type of Information** | **Percent of States Maintaining It** |
| Sex offender absconder list on public web site | 60 |
| On-line list of all sex offenders | 83 |
| On-line list of Tier II and III sex offenders only | 85 |

# Chapter 4
# Site Visits

The research team visited several state sex offender registration programs to assess the tracking and reporting and strategies to maintaining track of those offenders on the state registries. Questions were also posed to the subject matter experts to ascertain the problems facing the system's ability to achieve the programs' organizational goals and to determine the size and scope of the problem of "lost" offenders. This includes how the sex offenders manage their identities and manipulate their identities to avoid registration requirements.

Case study site selection was based on three criteria: size, location, and innovation and effectiveness of the registry. When reviewing the size of the state registry systems, three state systems where chosen to represent states having the largest number of registered sex offenders: California, Florida and Texas. Additionally, two states—Connecticut and Oklahoma—were seen to have a much smaller number of registered sex offenders. These states were chosen to determine whether "size matters" in terms of how sex offenders are monitored, and the techniques used to locate missing sex offenders.

The states visited were:
- California
- Connecticut
- Florida
- Ohio
- Oklahoma
- Texas

The remainder of this chapter summarizes the results of the six site visits and concludes with a review of the key findings.

# Findings

## *California*

In California, monitoring compliance and absconder location/apprehension is decentralized , and county task forces have been established and maintained utilizing Federal grants to support the program, including overtime for project personnel and access to technology designed to locate missing sex offenders. Interviewees reported a significant intra-state variation in non-compliance rates, with a low of 4.9% in San Diego (with 4,000 registers) and a high of 25% non-compliance in Los Angeles( with over 15,000 registers).

In Riverside County, California, interviews were conducted with key members of the Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement (SAFE) Task Force.  In California, monitoring compliance and absconder location and apprehension is decentralized , and county task forces have been established and maintained using federal grants to support the program, including overtime for project personnel and access to technology designed to locate missing sex offenders. In Riverside County, SAFE team members conduct at least one address verification per year, but due to contacts/verification by probation, local law enforcement, and/or the Sheriff's office, it is estimated that each registered sex offender is "seen" 2-3 times per year.

In some parts of California, a sex offender can move without notification and not be considered in violation if he subsequently, upon detection, agrees to re-register.  The majority of the absconders in Riverside County moved without notification to another part of the state; a small number leaves the state, and a few have left the country. Jurisdictions with active task forces appear to have greater access to technology. Offenders were said to have employed identity theft to avoid detection in two known cases.

## *Connecticut*

Connecticut's registry was initiated on October 1, 1998.  It currently has a moderately to highly centralized system that is administered by the Connecticut State Police through the Sex Offender Registry Unit, or SORU. Responsibility for locating and apprehending missing/non-compliant sex offenders is generally decentralized and left to local police agencies throughout the state. However, the State Police in Connecticut are involved in location and apprehension if the sex offender's last known residence is in one of the towns covered by the state police. All registered sex offenders must verify their residence every 90 days, via a mail-based address verification system. In addition, they must inform the Registry within 5 days of any changes in name, place of employment, school, and  Internet identifiers

As of the date of the visit, 5,095 sex offenders were registered through SORU.  At the time of the visit, about 8% of the registered sex offenders in Connecticut were listed as non-compliant; the majority of those failed to mail in an address verification. Those interviewed stated that in many cases they believe the verification letter is sent to a friend or family residence, and then forwarded on to the offender by Fed Ex, where it will be completed. It will then be returned to SORU, using the address of the family member or friend. Other offenders were said to alter their physical appearance to avoid detection.   Photo updates under the SORU system are required every five years, which interviewees said, allow offenders to change their appearance dramatically. SORU has also determined that a great number who are non-compliant use homeless shelters as addresses. This allows offenders to remain transient, posing a major hurdle for the tracking of offenders by law enforcement. Non-compliance was also said to be linked to mail-in verification system "glitches."

When trying to locate missing sex offenders, interviewees described SORU investigators employing  several techniques.  Generally, they begin with a routine investigation by speaking with family, friends, and neighbors.  If this is unsuccessful, they will cross-check the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Social Security Administration databases and commercial databases such as Accurint and Lexis/Nexis.  Interviewees generally described this to be a non-productive search method, since they claim there are too many "false positives" due to the fact there could be multiple hits for one particular name.

Interviewees explained that, in Connecticut, police have also used non-compliance sweeps that have been funded through special grants.  This was said to be "fruitful," noting that they have been able to locate nearly one-half of the missing sex offenders and bring them back into compliance. Those not found by any of these methods are reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, where the U.S. Marshall's Service will use more advanced techniques to locate absconders.

### Florida

At the time of the study site visit to Florida, the reporting requirement for Florida was described as "one in-person address verification"—by the absconder unit-- per year for all registered sex offenders. For those individuals classified as sexual predators, four verifications per year were described as being required. There was variation described in compliance rates identified by county ( and within county, by circuit), but overall state non-compliance was estimated at 5%.

At the time of the visit to the Central Florida Task Force (CFTF), the unit was supervised by a Osceola County Sheriff's Office detective.  CFTF was formed in April of 2009 and is dedicated to the sex offender registration, tracking, and to the discovery of those offenders who have absconded.   This unit encompasses the counties of Osceola, Orange, Hope, Lake, Volusia, Hernando, and a variety of municipalities within the designated region. There seems to be various dilemmas facing the CFTF in regards to not only registering and tracking offenders, but from the viewpoints of other agencies as well.  This includes the apathy that members of the

task force have encountered from other states' sex offender enforcement units when addressing out-of-state absconders that migrate to the area CFTF covers. Interviewees from the task force cited several cases in which they have found out-of-state absconders residing within the area covered by the task force and notified the states where the offenders had been registered. Those states expressed little interest in extraditing the absconders back to where they are registered, mainly due to the expense that would be borne to the registering state for extradition and prosecution.

It was reported that there has been too much "system satisfaction" just to get the offender to register according to SORNA, in that it appears to be a tendency not to register the offender until other offenses are committed by the offenders. It was stated that there is a lack of attention to the urgency for registration, and that "deals are made" to drop the non-sex related charges to get the offender to register. One detective believed that this sets a bad example, and these deals should never be struck since it sets the "bar too low."

Interviews also revealed that there is a perceived "lack of respect" regarding the role played by the CFTF with other law enforcement entities in their jurisdiction. They only seem to gain some type of legitimacy when a child is missing or molested, then the unit becomes a major role player, according to interviewees.

Tracking and notification standards by the CFTF were said to involve verifying the address of an offender within one week of being notified of where the offender is residing. This has been coupled with the practice of unannounced surprised visits by the detectives in charge of tracking, and therefore would allow them a greater chance to find those who are in violation of residency restrictions. Interviewees claimed that these surprise visits were directly responsible for reducing the level of offenders who do not register, and had pushed the rate of who fails to register or abscond to a new low. Offenders who are considered "sex predators" are seen by representatives of the CFTF, face-to-face on a monthly basis, while others are seen four times a year at their place of residence. Another tool used by CFTF is to post flyers in daycare and schools to notify those where children are located that a sex offender will be moving into the area.

There were various methods that absconders used to avoid detection, according to the CFTF. Many sex offenders who relocated to the CFTF counties from other states were said to be "quick to leave" once they discovered the stringent guidelines for registering and visits. One of the major reasons for offender transiency that was stated by interviewees was that of residency restrictions, or "anti-clustering" laws that prohibited the close clustering of sex offenders living within a neighborhood. This law, coupled with "over-verification" was seen as a cause of a rise in those offenders becoming homeless or living under bridges in some areas.

Interviewees pointed out that another requirement in Florida is that of marking licenses with a stamp identifying that person as a sex offender or predator. Many offenders are said to be altering or cutting this mark off to keep police officers from being alerted to the fact that they are on the sex registry if stopped for other offenses.

According to the Florida detectives interviewed, the majority of the sex offenders that do abscond do so to the homes of relatives or friends. It was also stated that the cases that had been seen of sex offender identity manipulation had primarily been that of the use of aliases by the sex offenders. Two were cited in which the sex offenders, themselves, had their identities stolen. This was reported as become a growing problem, since much of the sex offenders' personal information is made public, therefore making it easier convert this information into identity theft by other persons.

Locating absconders was described as coming down to basic police work. When an offender goes missing, CFTF representatives will interview friends, family, and neighbors of the last known residence. Video surveillance has also been used. In one instance, a CFTF detective was trying to "catch" a violating registered offender for not residing in the residence of record. Posing as a door-to-door surveyor, the detective went to the unregistered residence where the offender was and asked the offender if that was his place of residence. The offender stated that it was, and the detective placed the offender in violation of the residency requirements. The detective also stated he routinely researched utility bills to determine when the utilities were turned off to verify when an offender had vacated a registered residence and not updated his/her records.

CFTF also has used the DEFAX system to track the whereabouts of an absconder. This system is used to check the aliases, relatives, neighbors, other criminal records of the absconder and other information to track down them down. CFTF has also utilized "Offender Watch," which is a mapping system for tracking offenders. This is said to also be a useful tool for victims as well, since it is a public system.

## *Ohio*

To collect and review qualitative information in Ohio, research staff met and interviewed representatives of Ohio Deputy Sheriffs' Offices in Columbus, Ohio at a County Sheriff's Association conference. Representatives from most of Ohio's 88 counties were present. Attendees were asked to volunteer to participate in one-on-one interviews that could provide information on the sex offender registration and verification process. Interviewees included large, medium, and small counties. Information collected was found to be extensive and illuminating.

One of the first questions interviewees were asked was to describe the key decision points in the identification, registration, monitoring, and apprehension of sex offenders. One Sheriff's Office representative described the points as follows. The sex offender is first notified by DRC (Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections) that he/she has to register as a sex offender. If the offender has been pre-registered, the Sheriff's Office receives an electronic notification. The pre-registration process occurs directly after conviction of the individual. Once the court declares the individual as a sex offender, the court pre-registers the individual. This

process occurs before the individual enters prison. The current pre-registration process started in 2008 with the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act. Before 2008, there was already a pre-registration process but it was described as not being as effective as it is currently. The first time sex offenders are registered, a red finger printer card is used that identifies the individual as a sex offender. When officers look at the individual's record, there are signs on the screen that indicate the individual is a sex offender. Level 3 sex offenders receive a 7 day letter where they are requested to verify their information. They have 7 days to respond, if they don't an officer physically checks on them. If they are not there a warrant is issued.

Another interviewee stated that his county used to have one officer assigned to sex offender registration and verification only but they no longer had that due to budget cuts. Before the county had that position, the county used to be behind in terms of sex offender registration and verification process compared to the other counties. When the county was able to have the dedicated officer to sex offender registration and verification, it was able to have that position for 1.5 years. This was said to have resulted in the county having a more effective registration and verification process because the officer knew the names of the sex offenders that were in compliance, when checks had to be made, when registrations had to be made, and other verification processes. Since the county lost that position, the sex offender compliance checks are not being done by one person are done with many officers which was reported as not being as efficient because offenders were described as getting "lost." According to this interviewee, there had been a lack of coordination on which offenders are checked or not checked. At the time of the interview, officers in this county were said to check only if a "tip" is received letting them know the offender is out of compliance. When they get the call they send a patrol officer to check on the offender at the registered address.

In a third Ohio county, the corrections department was described as going over the registration process with the sex offender when he/she finishes his/her prison term. Sex offenders have three days to register after they leave prison. If the sheriff doesn't receive a notification from the corrections department , his office will not know that the sex offender needs to register. According to interviewees from this county, there are times when personnel from the corrections department do not inform the sheriff's office that a sex offender has been released from prison and needs to register in the county. Before sex offenders are released from prison, the sex offender will provide correction officers with an address where he/she will live. Once the sex offender is released from prison, if the sex offender doesn't physically report to the sheriff's office, officers will not know the address the individual has to register. This was said to occur especially when correction personnel fail to provide that information to the sheriff's office in case the sex offender doesn't register. The interviewee from this county suggested that the most serious problem the county has is the three day period from the period when sex offenders are released from prison to the time they have to register at the sheriff's office; the sex offender may not register at all and the sheriff will not know where the sex offender is. The main problem was said to be that the sheriff's office is "dependent" upon sex offenders letting officers know where they are living.

One county representative stated that The State Sex Offender Registry (SOR) has "few problems" because "it is just a collection point where data is put." Local courts were said to have a problem because prosecutors will not always accept cases in which a sex offender has been apprehended for being non-compliant. The parole department was described as alerting the sex offender that he/she has to register as a sex offender and that he/she is not allowed to live near a school or park zone. Sometimes, the parole department was characterized as failing to move the sex offender and also failing to notify the sheriff's office that the sex offender is living near a school zone and that he/she has been notified that he/she has to move. According to the interviewee, this leads to the county having a "cooperation problem" between parole department, probation, and law enforcement officers. Another county representative indicated that they had a major problem because there are so many schools in the county (there is no centralized schooling). This was said to result in challenges for sex offenders to be in compliance with the law because they find it difficult to find a place where they can legitimately reside.

The absconder problem was described in different ways by different county sheriffs' officers. In general, counties reported a 2% to 10% range of absconding. The forms of absconding varied. One interviewee reported that he could not really tell what patterns there are or characteristics sex offenders show that would lead officers to be believe that the individual will abscond. Perhaps it is a "cop's sixth sense" that tells them that the individual will be a problem. It is also based on whether the sex offender is more involved with the registration process because some absconders were said to have a history of non-compliance and previous criminal activity that is not sexual offense related. There are also those sex offenders who have already gone to prison for failure to comply with registration and verification requirements that once they are released from prison, they "just don't care to comply with the law or follow the rules."

Interviewees in Ohio described sex offenders who have no family or friend ties to the community where they live. One interviewee cited a case of a sex offender whose father and mother died, so the sex offender ended up leaving the county to try to track down his sister but did not notify authorities that he was leaving. Other cases were characterized as those in which sex offenders who have been institutionalized and are content to be there because they have housing and meals so that when they get out of prison, they don't care to be compliant. An interviewee from another county remembered two sex offenders who are "horrific." According to this interviewee, the offenders would not conform to the rules and had " no respect for the law." These two individuals were level 3 sex offenders. The interviewer was also told of a case where the sex offender notified the officers that he would be visiting family members at another county; he would be visiting for 2 weeks. The offender ultimately established a long term residence at that site.

One officer reported having seen other cases in which the family helps "hide offenders in plain sight." She remembered a case where a sex offender lived in his mother's house. When the sex offender noticed the police officer looking for him, he went to the woods that were located behind the house, so that he could not be found. The sheriff personally talked to the sex offender's mother to tell her that if the officers could not find him or the individual did not report himself at the sheriff's office then he will go back to jail. The next day, the sex offender appeared and contacted the sheriff's office. She also saw a case where the offender registered using his mother's

address but he was known to be living at his girlfriend's address that was located a few houses down from his mother's. The sex offender did not report his girlfriend's address. The officers visited him at the girlfriend's address and registered that address. This same officer encountered a case where two sex offenders (a married couple) who committed their offense in the State of Kentucky and moved to Ohio after serving their sentences, were providing a false address to an organization that was located in the State of Virginia. This organization would provide them with financial medical assistance. One of the sex offenders had cancer and they needed financial assistance to pay for her medical expenses. As sex offenders they would not qualify to obtain financial benefits so the married couple decided to use a false address indicating they lived in the State of Virginia when in reality they lived in the State of Ohio

In general, county sheriff officers interviewed in Ohio had seen some cases in which sex offenders will "play" with their addresses, as they put it. For example, a sex offender registers an address but spends more time at the girlfriend's house which might be located across town. The sex offender does not register this address because the sheriff's office will then have to notify the community that a sex offender has moved into the community. This "doesn't work for the sex offender" because it creates difficulties for the girlfriend so the offender decides not to notify the sheriff's office. This type of problem was stated as being hard to control because the officers will not know that the sex offenders have moved to another address unless they are notified.

### Oklahoma

At the time of the site visit, interviewees reported that there were 6,282 registered sex offenders in Oklahoma. At the time, 885 were said to be in violation of registration requirements. Those interviewed included the head administrator for the Oklahoma State Sex Offender Registry Unit, a detective and a lieutenant, and a criminal investigator with the U.S. Marshall's Service. According to the interviewees, Oklahoma faces similar problems with offenders who try to avoid registration and detection as other law-enforcement agencies in other states.

This includes offenders moving to other states or counties to avoid registering, obtaining utility bills in their children's name and social security number, and offenders who register as homeless even if they are not. The use of other names or variation of the offenders name is very common, and this type of scenario is seen more than the use of identity theft. There were also multiple examples of using false information, such as the case of a sex offender who was in the military and attempted to register for flight school. When the flight school tried to obtain background verification on the offender, it was discovered he gave false information to the flight school to avoid the discovery of his record as a sex offender.

## Texas

In Texas, the initial registration, monitoring compliance, and absconder location/apprehension is a decentralized function; in some parts of the state( e.g. Dallas) Multi-Agency Task Forces have been established, but in many areas the responsibility falls on local police departments. The statewide sex offender registry data base is maintained by the State Office of Public Safety.

At the time of the site visit, the requirement was one address verification per year. Sex offenders who have been civilly committed ( n=1,200), or transients ( 1,500 statewide) are required to verify address every thirty days. Sex offenders with 2 or more priors must appear every 90 days at a local police department.

According to the Director of the Sex Offender Registration system, about 12% of the 57,000 active cases on the system were in non-compliance; in a significant number of these non-compliance case, system errors—not offender non-compliance—were the problem. However, no jurisdiction –specific compliance rates have been calculated to date. No evidence of identity theft was cited, but aliases were said to often be used to avoid detection during police stops. At the time of the visit cuts in Federal grants were said to have resulted in fewer personnel, which translates to limitations in the types of searches completed on available data bases. Non-compliance was cited as sometimes a possible function of clerical errors at the local level in this decentralized system.

## Conclusions

The first key finding centers on how the responsibility for monitoring compliance with sex offender registration and for locating absconders varied from state to state. There are three distinct models:

1. **Centralized Model** – This is typically an established statewide sex offender unit to manage compliance/ non-compliance.
2. **Decentralized Model** – Enforcement compliance/non-compliance is the responsibility of either a local, county, or regional responsibility of law enforcement.
3. **Hybrid Model** – Systems combine features of centralization (the registry data base and/or initial registration) and compliance monitoring (by local police or task forces).

The second finding results from site visits revealed that reporting requirements for registered sex offenders vary from state to state. For example, in Florida it was found that the t requirement consists of one in-person address verification per year for all registered sex

offenders, which is completed by the absconder unit. For those individuals classified as sexual predators, four verifications per year are required.  A registration requirement in Connecticut consists of mandatory verification of the sex offenders' residency every 90 days, via a mail-based address verification system.  In addition, they must inform the Registry within five days of any changes in name, place of employment, school, and internet identifiers.  California's Riverside County SAFE team members must conduct at least one address verification  per year, but due to contacts/verification by probation, local law enforcement, and/or the Sheriff's office, it is estimated that each registered sex offender is "seen" two to three times per year.

In general, those interviewed during the site visits offered valuable "first hand" reflections on sex offender registration and tracking in their states. Maintaining a viable registration and tracking system in their states can prove to be challenging for a variety of reasons ranging from system "gaps," to less than optimal inter-agency/inter-jurisdictional cooperation, to technological "glitches." Particularly informative, were characterizations of reasons and methods used for offender absconding. Some described offenders who had become weary of complying with registration requirements and had simply decided to find any means possible to evade effective monitoring. None of the methods sited were seen as particularly sophisticated, but did not appear to need to be to take advantage of system vulnerabilities. "Hiding in plain sight" might prove to be as simple as cutting off indicators of sex offender status from drivers' licenses to being housed by sympathetic family and friends willing to provide shelter from the monitoring system. Some of those interviewed even expressed some empathy for those offenders who find it demanding to acquire a residence in an area now considered off limits to registered sex offenders because of the prevalence of residency restrictions. Finally, methods of aggressive efforts to monitor offender activities (and, ultimately, track down absconders)  used by some interviewed, underscored how effective they can be, but also how they may indirectly steer registered offenders from residing in those areas if they feel the system is too invasive or  if they are, indeed, intent upon absconding.

# Chapter 5
# National Survey of Subject-Matter Experts

As a part of this project, a survey of all state sexual offender registration systems was developed and implemented to determine the range and details of existing strategies employed to track and report on registered sexual offenders. The law-enforcement survey aimed to describe and assess: (1) the range of strategies used to track and report on registered sex offenders, (2) problems associated with achieving the programs' organizational goals, and (3) the size and scope of the problem of "lost" offenders.

The following section describes the data and methods used in the national survey. Next, the findings are presented in five subsections: (1) agency information, (2) agency volume and workload, (3) monitoring and verification systems, (4) registration noncompliance, and (5) tracking and apprehension strategies (See Appendix A for further details on survey items and findings).

## Methodology

Survey requests were sent to law-enforcement agents to participate in the "Sex Offender Authentication Project Survey." The sampled law-enforcement officers was obtained by conducting Internet searches of law-enforcement officials including state, county, and city police departments; sheriffs' departments, and state troopers. Selection criteria include listings by the state Sex Offender Registration Unit detailing law-enforcement contacts, reviewing individual agencies' sex offender unit contacts, and unit chief information. The one exception was New York State, which supplied a list of those willing to participate in the survey.

CIMIP received responses from 228 agencies. The participating agencies represented 46 states and the District of Columbia, excluding the following four states: Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, and West Virginia. The agencies managed a total of 89,015 registered sex offenders. According to the National Center of Missing and Exploited Children, the United States had 739,853 registered sex offenders as of June 17, 2011. Our sample data thus cover about 12% of the total registered sex offenders in the United States.

The survey instrument itself consisted of a combination of 43 closed-ended and open-ended questions covering the areas of (1) strategies used to track and report on registered sex offenders, (2) problems associated with achieving the program's organizational goals, and (3) the size and scope of the problem of "lost" offenders.

# Findings

## *Agency Information*

Of the 228 reporting law-enforcement agencies, 135 (59.2%) are from nine states.  Figure 5.1 shows that Texas has the most responses ($n = 30$, 13.2%), followed by New York ($n = 26$, 11.4%).  Fifteen states provided only 1 response, including California, which has the largest number of registered sex offenders (106,216 as of June 17, 2011).  Florida, which also has a large number of registered sex offenders (55,999 as of June 17, 2011), also has a low number of responses ($n = 4$, 1.7%).



**Figure 5.1.  Top Nine Responding Law-Enforcement Agencies**

**Figure 5.2.  U.S. Regions and Numbers of Participating Law-Enforcement Agencies**

As shown in Figure 5.2, the data were divided into the five U.S. regions:  Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West.  Most responses are from agencies in the Midwest ($n = 52$, 23%), followed by the West ($n = 49$, 22%), and then the Southeast ($n = 48$, 21%). The fewest responses are from the Northeast ($n = 37$, 16%) and the Southwest ($n = 42$, 18%).

As illustrated in Figure 5.3, most agencies in the sample have county jurisdiction ($n = 133$, 58.3%).  Just over a third of agencies have local/municipal jurisdiction ($n = 80$, 35.1%), while relatively few agencies have state jurisdiction ($n = 15$, 6.6%).

**Figure 5.3.  Types of Jurisdiction of Responding U.S. Law-Enforcement Agencies**

**Figure 5.4. Agency Functions**

Approximately 90% of responding law-enforcement agencies monitor registration compliance ($n = 205$, 90.3%) and apprehend missing suspects ($n = 202$, 89.0%), as displayed in Figure 5.4. Approximately three-quarters of agencies perform data entry and maintain registry information ($n = 178$, 78.5%) and identify missing registrants ($n = 178$, 78.4%). Less than one-fifth of agencies have a designated registrant tier or level function ($n = 39$, 17.2%).

Approximately one-third of local law-enforcement agencies ($n = 28$, 35%) reported no involvement in sex offender registration data management. As one respondent explained, "We do not register sex offenders at the PD. Instead, we participate in a county-wide sex crimes task force." The remaining local agencies ($n = 51$, 65%) maintain their own database for sex offender registration, as explained by another respondent:

> We maintain our own database of local predatory offenders who reside in our city. It is available to our patrol officers in their squad cars and it includes photos of the subjects, their identifying information (tattoos, scars), and vehicles they operate and well as employment information.

Responses generally indicate that the agencies perform multiple functions. While less than 10% of agencies perform only one function ($n = 20$, 8.8%), it is more common for agencies to report performing a combination of functions, such as data management, monitoring, identification, and apprehension. Thirty-five agencies (15.0%) perform all five functions listed in Figure 5.4, and 111 agencies (48.7%) perform four functions. Eleven agencies (4.8%) concentrate exclusively on apprehension of missing subjects.

Figure 5.5 summarizes results to questions about the role of individuals within these agencies.



**Figure 5.5. Individual Respondents' Functions**

The most common role was registration compliance ($n = 159$, 70.0%), followed by supervision and unit management ($n = 149$, 65.6%), identifying missing registrants ($n = 136$, 59.9%), apprehending missing registrants ($n = 134$, 59.0%), data entry and maintenance of registry information ($n = 131$, 57.7%), and then tiering ($n = 31$, 13.7%). It is most common for individuals to perform four of these functions ($n = 120$, 52.6%), while less than one-tenth of respondents perform all six functions ($n = 31$, 6.1%).

## Agency Volume and Workload

As shown in Table 5.1, the total number of registered sex offenders reported by participating law-enforcement agencies is 89,015. The 89,015 registered sex offenders identified in the national survey represent approximately 12% of the total population of 739,853 registered sex offenders in the United States as of June 17, 2011 (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2011).

| Table 5.1. Agency Volume | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | Sum | Mean (SD) | Median |
| Sex Offenders | 89,015 | 397.4 (1817.4) | 80 |
| Full-time Equivalent Officers | 683 | 3.06 (6.58) | 1 |
| New Registrants per Month | 1,090 | 4.96 (12.16) | 2 |

The mean number of registered sex offenders for an agency is 397. Approximately 683 full-time equivalent (FTE) officers are responsible for these 89,015 registered sex offenders, which gives each officer a caseload of 130 registrants. The mean number of FTE officers per agency is 3. Overall, the agencies reported that they receive 1,090 new registrants per month. Each agency, then, receives a mean of nearly 5 new registrants each month.

One local agency reported that it has 0 registered sex offenders, while two agencies reported having more than 15,000 registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction ($n = 16,406$ and $n = 20,000$).[1] The mean number of registered sex offenders in local jurisdictions is 222.76, the mean number of registered sex offenders in county jurisdictions is 193.24, and the mean number of registered sex offenders in state jurisdictions is 3529.15. Overall, Figure 5.6 indicates that it is most common for agencies to report between 10 and 100 registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction ($n = 99$, 45.4%). Relatively few agencies ($n = 10$, 4.6%) have more than 1,000 registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction.

The number of FTE officers varies widely across participating agencies. Thirty-one agencies (13.9%) reported having no FTE officers, meaning they have no designated officer for the sex offender management unit. Four law-enforcement agencies reported having one part-time employee who manages the sex offender registry. It is most common for agencies to report having one FTE

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[1] These latter two cases significantly affect the mean and standard deviation. Since these two cases involve state jurisdiction, we ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to compare the average number of sex offenders for three jurisdictions. The results of the ANOVA test are statistically significant at .000.

officer (n = 108, 48.4%).  Twenty-nine agencies (13%) reported having two FTE officers, while sixteen agencies (7.2%) reported having between 10 and 50 FTE officers.



**Figure 5.6.  Number of Registered Sex Offenders in Jurisdictions of Reporting Agencies**

**Figure 5.7.  Average Percentage of Types of Sex Offender Supervision**

Survey respondents reported a range of new incoming registrants per month from 0 to 120.  Forty-nine agencies (22.3%) reported that they receive 0–1 new registrants per month, 81 agencies (36.8%) reported receiving 1–2 new registrants per month, and two agencies (about 1%) reported receiving more than 100 new registrants per month.  The mean number of new registrants per month is 4.39 for local agencies, 3.1 for county agencies, and 26.92 for state agencies.

As Figure 5.7 illustrates, eleven percent of registered sex offenders within the jurisdiction of sampled agencies is under parole supervision, while 21% is under probation supervision.  More than half of the supervised sex offenders (56%) are under no formal supervision, and the remaining 12% of registered sex offenders is under unknown supervision.

Table 5.2 shows how frequently the sampled agencies use the different supervision forms for registered sex offenders.

| Table 5.2. Types and Frequency of Use of Sex Offender Supervision | | |
|---|---|---|
| Type of Supervision | Number (Percent) of Agencies Using It | N |
| Parole Supervision | 141 (66.5%) | 212 |
| Probation Supervision | 179 (81.4%) | 220 |
| No Formal Supervision | 178 (84.3%) | 211 |
| Unknown Supervision | 60 (29.4%) | 204 |

Approximately two-thirds of reporting agencies ($n = 141$, 66.5%) use parole supervision, 5 of which (2.2%) use parole for all currently registered sex offenders. Just over four-fifths of agencies ($n = 179$, 81.4%) use probation supervision for their registered sex offenders, 3 of which (1.4%) indicated that all of their currently registered sex offenders are on probation. It was most common for agencies to report no formal supervision ($n = 178$, 84.3%), 8 of which (3.8%) indicated that all of their registrants are under some form of informal supervision. Three-fifths of agencies ($n = 60$, 29.4%) selected the unknown supervision response, with 18 of these agencies (8.8%) reporting that all registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction are under unknown supervision.

Eleven agencies did not report their jurisdiction's system for classifying sex offenders for registration purposes. Of the agencies that did report this information, Figure 5.8 shows that 69 agencies (39%) classify offenders into tiers based solely on conviction offense and/or offense history, 35 agencies (20.0%) classify offenders based on a risk-assessment process that takes into account offense characteristics and other factors, 49 agencies (28.0%) use a single tier with special designations for small groups of particularly high-risk offenders (e.g., sexual predators), and 23 agencies (13.0%) handle all registered sex offenders as a single group in terms of establishing registration requirements.

Responses to an open-ended question clarify the findings reported in Figure 5.8. Many respondents revealed that classification normally is completed by the courts, state department of corrections (including parole and probation), state police, or state sex offender registry office. Thus, a substantial portion of respondents simply register and monitor sex offenders based on the state classification; for example: "This department does not classify offender levels – this is done at the state level." And:

We really don't have "tiers."  Adults with serious felonies register every 3 months.  All juveniles, offenders convicted of attempted crimes, and/or less serious offenses are required to register once per year.  The frequency is set by statute. Our SVPs are determined by the court and are based on 5 criteria:  (1) date of offense, (2) age of offender (>18), (3) result of psychological risk assessment, (4) relationship to victim (must be a stranger, or a cultivated relationship for the specific purpose of the assault), [and] (4) crime of conviction.



**Figure 5.8.  Classification Systems for Registering Sex Offenders**

## *Verification and Monitoring Systems*

This subsection presents results about which verification procedures the agencies use for sex offender information and how monitoring is accomplished.  Figure 5.9 shows that collateral contact interviews and address verification are the least-used methods: Thirty percent of agencies never use the former, and 29% of agencies never use the latter.  Conversely, in-person interviews and unannounced field visits are popular.  Twenty percent of agencies conduct face-to-face interviews with registered sex offenders four times a year, and another 6% conducts face-to-face interviews twelve times a year.  Approximately 15% of agencies conduct unannounced field visits four times a year, while 8% of agencies do so twelve times a year.

Figure 5.9 also shows that all verification systems commonly are used with variable (or fluctuating) frequency. Analyses (not shown here) revealed that 64.9% of agencies reported that their monitoring provisions vary based on offender risk or management levels. An illustration of how this happens is provided in Figure 5.10.



**Figure 5.9. Frequency of Use of Alternative Verification Systems**

**State**

- The state agency sends out letters twice a month to offenders. If the letter is not deliverable, the county is contacted. The state agency then attempts to make physical contact. When the offender comes to register, his/her file is updated with any new information. If his/her appearance has changed, a new photo is taken.

**County**

- Current state laws require convicted adult criminal sex offenders to register in person every six months, and convicted youthful sex offenders must register once a year. If a sex offender intends to change his/her place of residence or employment, 30-day advance notice is required.

**Local**

- Municpal code requires qualifying sex offenders and predators to register and verify in person twice a year (3 months prior to birth month and 3 months after birth month). The local agency conducts address verification on a quarterly basis by making physical contact with the offender at his/her residence. Address also may be verified through neighbors, landlords, and co-habitants.

**Figure 5.10. Example of How Monitoring Varies by Offender Risk and Management Level**

## Registration Noncompliance

On average, agencies report that approximately 5% of the registered sex offender population in their jurisdiction is noncompliant. As displayed in Figure 5.11, less than a third of agencies reported that all registrants are compliant ($n = 62$, 29.1%), while 48.3% of agencies ($n = 103$) reported less than 5% of their sex offender population as noncompliant, and 1.9% ($n = 4$) of agencies reported 48–50% of their offenders as noncompliant.[2] Nine agencies (4.5%) indicated that they have more than 100 noncompliant sex offenders; one of these agencies reported 820 noncompliant sex offenders.

**Figure 5.11. Amount of Noncompliant Offenders**

**Figure 5.12.  Amount of Absconded or Missing Offenders**

We divided the total number of sex offenders in the sample by the percentage of noncompliant sex offenders.  Nearly 4% of registered sex offenders are noncompliant ($n = 3,310$, 3.72%).  Applied to the population of registered sex offenders throughout the United States, the result is a national estimate of 27,523 noncompliant registered sex offenders.  And states have an average of 15.69 noncompliant registered sex offenders at any given time.

Approximately half of the agencies reported that they have less than 10 offenders absconding or missing ($n = 106$, 49.7%), and 40% of agencies ($n = 86$) reported that none of their noncompliant sex offenders are absconders or missing, as shown in Figure 5.12.  The total number of absconded or missing sex offenders is 1,335, which is 40.3% of the noncompliant offenders in the sample.  Applied to the estimated noncompliant population in the United States, the national estimate is 11,091 absconders or missing registered sex offenders.

Table 5.3 shows why registered sex offenders do not comply.  Agencies were asked to select one of the following responses for questions measuring each of the variables listed in Table 5.3:  0 = "rarely," 1 = "fairly rare," 2 = "occasionally," 3 = "fairly common," or 4 = "very common."

**Table 5.3.  Factors Commonly Contributing to Registration Noncompliance**

| Variable | Percent Fairly Common or Very Common | Mean (SD) | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indifference to requirements | 34.0 | 1.92 (1.27) | 221 |
| Lack of understanding | 17.7 | 1.52 (1.1) | 225 |
| Unintentional oversight | 17.8 | 1.48 (1.12) | 224 |
| Rebellion against requirements | 29.3 | 1.72 (1.33) | 225 |
| Detection avoidance | 25.5 | 1.73 (1.32) | 223 |

The factor most commonly contributing to registration non-compliance is indifference to requirements, as 34% of agencies ($n = 75$) reported this is being "very common" or "fairly common."  Rebellion against requirements ($n = 66$, 29.3%) and detection avoidance ($n = 57$, 25.5%) were the next most common factors leading to registration noncompliance.  Lack of understanding ($n = 40$, 17.7%) and unintentional oversight ($n = 40$, 17.8%) were the least commonly cited factors leading to registration noncompliance.

Respondents were asked whether they had experienced the following scenarios:
- Just stops reporting = Registrant does little to avoid detection; s/he remains at the registered location but simply stops reporting.
- Local move = Registrant moves to a new location within the same jurisdiction and stops reporting.
- In-state move = Registrant moves to a new location in the same state but outside the jurisdiction and fails to report.
- Out-of-state move = Registrant moves to a new state and fails to report.
- Out-of-country move = Registrant leaves the United States.
- ID theft = Registrant attempts to conceal his/her identity using identity theft (i.e., stealing and assuming the identity of another individual).
- ID manipulation = Registrant attempts to conceal his/her identity by using an alias.

Table 5.4 shows how frequently participating agencies reporting having experienced each of these scenarios leading up to registration noncompliance.

| Table 5.4. Scenarios Leading to Registration Noncompliance | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | **Percent Fairly Often or Very Often** | **Mean (SD)** | ***N*** |
| Just stops reporting | 25.0% | 1.72 (1.07) | 228 |
| Local move | 34.7% | 1.94 (1.06) | 228 |
| In-state move | 47.8% | 2.21 (1.04) | 228 |
| Out-of-state move | 30.7% | 1.90 (1.07) | 228 |
| Out-of-country move | 7.0% | 0.86 (0.94) | 228 |
| ID theft | 2.6% | 0.68 (0.78) | 228 |
| ID manipulation | 7.5% | 0.96 (0.95) | 228 |

In-state move ($n = 109$, 47.8%) especially, and then local move ($n = 79$, 34.7%) and out-of-state move ($n = 70$, 30.7%), are the most common precursors to failure to report. ID theft ($n = 6$, 2.6%) and then out-of-country move ($n = 16$, 7.0%) and ID manipulation ($n = 17$, 7.5%) are the least common precursors to registration noncompliance.

The survey asked respondents to provide more information about ID theft and manipulation cases in their jurisdiction. Twenty-two agencies reported that approximately 1% of registered sex offenders use identity manipulation to avoid detection, and 21 agencies reported that 1–5% of registered sex offenders do so in their jurisdiction. An example of the responses to open-ended questions on this topic is: "Offender used an alias when first arrested and that alias followed him through the registration process so he was registered under the incorrect name."

Eleven respondents were aware of cases in which registrants in their jurisdiction used identity theft for the purpose of avoiding detection. An example of identity theft by registered sex offenders is:

Offender fled the state, ended up in Georgia, using another name and social security number, stabbed another man in a bar fight and was sent to prison. When he is released from prison in GA, he will be returned to Ohio to face charges of failing to register as a sex offender and failing to register an address change as well as parole violation.

Respondents indicated that sex offenders use various forms of identifying information, such as false or different names, social security numbers, or date of birth. All stolen identifying information was said to have come from someone the sex offender knows: co-workers, roommates, friends, and family members. For example, one sex offender used his deceased father's identifying information. Respondents also reported that sex offenders manipulate their identity by altering their own name, such as by changing either the first or last name or using their maiden name.

Although the number of responses on ID manipulation and theft reported here might seem small, these numbers reflect sex offenders who had used multiple aliases when arrested for non-sex offenses. Moreover, respondents reported identity theft cases when sex offenders were arrested for assault, drugs, or rape. A large number of sex offenders using ID manipulation/theft probably go undetected.

### *Tracking and Apprehension Strategies*
The final set of questions asked about tactics and techniques used by agencies to locate and apprehend noncompliant registrants. Figure 5.13 shows that it is most common for noncompliant offenders to be located within one week (28.0%). One-quarter of noncompliant offenders are located within one month, and another 17% are located within one day.

**Figure 5.13. Timeframe for Locating Noncompliant Offenders**

Figure 5.14 shows a somewhat similar pattern for absconders and missing registered sex offenders. It is most common for absconders and missing offenders to be located within one week (20.6%). One-fifth of absconders and missing offenders are located within one month, and another 18.5% are located within one year.

**Figure 5.14. Timeframe for Locating Absconders and Missing Offenders**

**Figure 5.15.  Resources Used to Locate and Apprehend Absconded and Missing Offenders**

Respondents answered questions about how often they use various resources to locate and apprehend absconders and missing registrants.  Figure 5.15 displays these results.  Special apprehension units and the U.S. Marshall's Service are used the most, while the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children is used the least.  Seventeen percent of agencies use special apprehension units very frequently, and another 9.4% of agencies use special apprehension units somewhat frequently.  The U.S. Marshall's Service is used very frequently by 10.8% of agencies and somewhat frequently by 9.9% of agencies.  Conversely, 6.4% of agencies use the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children very or somewhat frequently, while 12.7% of agencies use interstate compacts very or somewhat frequently.

The survey included 13 matrix questions about the use of data technology approaches in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders.  These results are presented in Figure 5.16.  Criminal history information and driver's licenses/RMV data files are the most common forms of data technology used to locate and apprehend absconded and missing registered sex offenders.  Bank and credit card records are used the least.

**Figure 5.16. Data Technology Approaches Used to Locate and Apprehend Absconded and Missing Offenders**

When respondents were asked which data technology approach they think is the most effective, the majority ranked driver's license/RMV data file as the most effective approach ($n = 113$, 51.3%). Criminal history systems were ranked as the second most effective approach ($n = 84$, 38.7%), and commercial databases (e.g., LexisNexis) were ranked third ($n = 33$, 15.2%).

Survey respondents were asked how frequently they used various contact-based approaches to locate and apprehend missing registrants. Figure 5.17 presents these results (The purple and green bar in the probation/parole consultant row represents data combined for the "frequently" and "all" cases category). Last known address visits and probation/parole consultants were the most common contact-based approaches used to locate missing offenders, whereas victim interviews and treatment provider interviews were the least common approaches.

**Figure 5.17. Contact-based Approaches Used to Locate and Apprehend Absconded and Missing Offenders**

Respondents reported believing that last known address visits are the most effective approach ($n = 124$, 56.6%). They reported that neighbor interviews are the second most effective approach ($n = 71$, 32.9%), and that family interviews are the third most effective approach ($n = 52$, 24.3%).

Finally, respondents were asked which type of approach—data technology or contact-based—they use the most. It is most common for agencies to report equal use of data technology and contact methods for locating offenders ($n = 102$, 48.3%). Sixty-three agencies (29.9%) primarily use contact-based approaches, and 27 agencies (12.8%) primarily use data technology approaches. No agency reported the sole use of data technology, while 19 agencies (9%) reported sole use of contact-based approaches.

# Chapter 6
# Location of "Lost" Offenders

The previous chapters outlined SORNA requirements and described the progress states have made in implementing them. The previous chapter revealed a substantial number of absconded and missing offenders. Supplementing earlier data sources, this chapter proposes a method for locating these "lost" sex offenders.

This chapter describes the federal sex offender data and presents preliminary results based on them. The next chapter introduces ID Analytics, a commercial organization that observes one-third to one-half of all U.S. applications for consumer purchases such as credit cards, cell phones, and other financial products.

## NSOR Data and Findings

CIMIP and ID Analytics requested and obtained access to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) database on sex offenders for 2009, also known as the National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR). These data were then extrapolated and analyzed by both CIMIP and ID Analytics. This section outlines the data analysis completed by CIMIP only.

The initial NSOR data set received contained 798,805 records. In this dataset, there were over 1,701 data fields for each record. After an extensive effort to clean the database by removing duplicate entries and consolidating records, 153,777 duplicate records were deleted, leaving 645,028 cleaned records. Empty data fields were also deleted, leaving 144 usable fields of information per record for analysis. It is found that 71%, of the data record fields on the original database submitted for analysis were not utilized in any manner, even though it contained header field labels for offender information.

The NSOR database received from the FBI/CJIS includes identifying information registered sex offenders supply to each state and territory as required under SORNA. This includes data on the name, multiple aliases, and social security numbers utilized by offenders, current criminal status, addresses and other information on the registrants. Additional information in the database includes historical information, deported status, incarcerated, deceased offenders, offenders on probation, parole and absconded offenders, and registrants who had missing social security numbers.

The data were analyzed and placed into four sets: basic demographic information, multiple social security number count, multiple alias count, and sexual predator count. This information was further broken down into subsets that focus on the numbers of multiple aliases and multiple social security numbers as compared to sex offender's compliance. There was a further subset of data created which focused on the state region of the data analysis. This was determined by using the "Census Regions and Divisions of the United States" topographical for this subset of data.

## General Demographic Information

A breakdown of general demographics of registered sex offenders on the NSOR database was done based on regions indicating that 97.64%, or 629,799 of the registrants were male, 2.22% were female, and 0.14% of the data had no information as to the gender of the offender. The greatest concentrations of offenders were located in the Southern region, followed by the Midwest, the West, Northeast, and the Territories of the United States respectively. Out of these regions, the South contained the highest percentage of male offenders at 36.56%, followed by the Midwest. The same held true for female offenders, with the South and Midwest containing the higher percentage of offenders respectively. Table 6.1 shows a breakdown of the gender of offenders.

| Table 6.1. Gender of Registered Sex Offenders by U.S. Region | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Region | Number of Males | Percent of Males | Number of Females | Percent of Females | Total Number of Offenders |
| Midwest | 167,459 | 26.6 | 4,098 | 28.6 | 171,564 |
| Northeast | 88,427 | 14.0 | 1,704 | 11.9 | 91,013 |
| South | 230,261 | 36.6 | 5,638 | 39.3 | 235,902 |
| West | 143,167 | 22.7 | 2,891 | 20.2 | 146,062 |
| Territories | 483 | 0.1 | 4 | 0.0 | 487 |
| Total Number of Offenders | 629,799 | | 14,335 | | 645,028 |
| Total Percent of Offenders | 97.64 | | 2.22 | | |

Table 6.2 displays a breakdown of age and region.  According to the analysis, the age range with the highest offender rate was 35–49 with 39.07%, followed by those offenders registered age 50 and over at 34.63%.  Once again, the Southern region had the highest rate of sex offenders registered from the age brackets 25–34, 35–49, and the offenders 50 and over.  The Midwest had the highest populations of registered sex offenders 17 and younger and 18–24.

Table 6.3 displays a breakdown of race and region.  The race categories according to the SORNA data received were broken down into White ("Caucasian"), Asian, Black ("African American"), Indian ("Native American"), or Unknown.  Further review revealed that Hispanic offenders were included in the statistics for the category for "White" offenders, which distorts the actual numbers of registered "White" registered sex offenders on the SORNA data file since there is no distinction for the Hispanic race.  According to Table 6.3, Caucasian constituted 72.87% of all registered offenders, followed by African Americans at 22.36%.   The South, Midwest, followed by the West held the highest number of registered Caucasian offenders.   The South, followed by the Midwest held the highest number of African American registered sex offenders.   The Western region also had the highest proportion of Asian and Native American registered offenders.

| Region | No. 17 and Younger | % 17 and Younger | No. 18–24 | % 18–24 | No. 25–34 | % 25–34 | No. 35–49 | % 35–49 | No. 50 and Older | % 50 and Older | Total Number of Offenders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Midwest | 515 | 39.25 | 11,997 | 40.73 | 43,452 | 31.29 | 66,887 | 26.54 | 48,713 | 21.81 | 171,564 |
| Northeast | 169 | 12.88 | 3,104 | 10.54 | 18,491 | 13.31 | 37,223 | 14.77 | 32,026 | 14.34 | 91,013 |
| South | 140 | 10.67 | 8,275 | 28.09 | 50,998 | 36.72 | 96,061 | 38.12 | 80,428 | 36.00 | 235,902 |
| West | 484 | 36.89 | 6,061 | 20.58 | 25,829 | 18.60 | 51,622 | 20.49 | 62,066 | 27.78 | 146,062 |
| Territories | 4 | 0.30 | 18 | 0.06 | 115 | 0.08 | 190 | 0.08 | 160 | 0.07 | 487 |
| Total Number of Offenders | 1,312 | | 29,455 | | 138,885 | | 251,983 | | 223,393 | | 645,028 |
| Total Percent of Offenders | 0.20 | | 4.57 | | 21.53 | | 39.07 | | 34.63 | | |

**Table 6.2. Age of Registered Sex Offenders by Region**

*Notes.* No = Number. % = Percent.

| Region | No. Caucasian | % Caucasian | No. Asian | % Asian | No. African American | % African American | No. Native American | % Native American | No. Unknown | % Unknown | Total Number of Offenders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Midwest | 126,050 | 26.82 | 1,346 | 25.57 | 35,828 | 24.84 | 2,904 | 30.93 | 5,436 | 33.75 | 171,564 |
| Northeast | 61,673 | 13.12 | 682 | 12.95 | 22,760 | 15.78 | 291 | 3.10 | 5,607 | 34.81 | 91,013 |
| South | 163,517 | 34.79 | 680 | 12.92 | 69,234 | 48.00 | 1,053 | 11.22 | 1,418 | 8.80 | 235,902 |
| West | 118,766 | 25.27 | 2,248 | 42.70 | 16,398 | 11.37 | 5,139 | 54.74 | 3,511 | 21.80 | 146,062 |
| Territories | 22 | 0.01 | 309 | 5.87 | 21 | 0.01 | 1 | 0.01 | 134 | 0.83 | 487 |
| Total Number of Offenders | 470,028 | | 5,265 | | 144,241 | | 9,388 | | 16,106 | | 645,028 |
| Total Percent of Offenders | 72.87 | | 0.82 | | 22.36 | | 1.46 | | 2.50 | | |

Table 6.3. Race of Registered Sex Offenders by Region

*Notes.* No = Number. % = Percent.

### *Multiple Social Security Number Counts Comparison:  National and Regional*

CIMIP performed an analysis of the NSOR data to determine offender's usage of multiple social security numbers.  This was reported at the time the offender was required to register under the guidelines as set out under SORNA.

The results of this analysis can be found in Table 6.4.  According to breakdown, most regions followed the national average for offenders not disclosing any social security number, with the exception of the Western region average which was over almost 8% over the national average.  This may be due to states not reporting this information for NSOR reporting.  Most of the regions were above the national average for reporting one social security number for each offender registered, with the exceptions occurring in the Midwest and West as below the national percentage.  Once again, this could be due to missing information reported to NSOR.

Most of the statistics for multiple social security numbers remained close to the national average, and appeared to be unremarkable.  However, it should be noted that 10,460 of the registered sex offenders had 3 or more social security numbers.

| No. of SSNs | Total No. of Offenders | National Average % | Midwest | Midwest Regional % Average | Northeast | Northeast Regional % Average | South | South Regional % Average | West | West Regional % Average | U.S. Territory | U.S. Territory Regional % Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No SSN | 94,821 | 14.70 | 24,303 | 14.17 | 13,575 | 14.92 | 23,837 | 10.10 | 33,096 | 22.66 | 10 | 2.05 |
| 1 SSN | 462,722 | 71.74 | 100,746 | 58.72 | 72,836 | 80.03 | 90,852 | 80.90 | 97,813 | 66.97 | 475 | 97.54 |
| 2 SSNs | 77,025 | 11.94 | 44,534 | 25.96 | 3,413 | 3.75 | 17,179 | 7.28 | 11,897 | 8.15 | 2 | 0.41 |
| 3 SSNs | 7,512 | 1.16 | 1,457 | 0.85 | 837 | 0.92 | 2,960 | 1.25 | 2,258 | 1.55 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 4 SSNs | 1,864 | 0.29 | 322 | 0.19 | 213 | 0.23 | 710 | 0.30 | 619 | 0.42 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 5 SSNs | 237 | 0.04 | 51 | 0.03 | 33 | 0.04 | 76 | 0.03 | 77 | 0.05 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 6 SSNs | 636 | 0.10 | 117 | 0.07 | 73 | 0.08 | 220 | 0.09 | 226 | 0.15 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 7 SSNs | 111 | 0.02 | 21 | 0.01 | 17 | 0.02 | 33 | 0.01 | 40 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 8 SSNs | 56 | 0.01 | 6 | 0.003 | 11 | 0.01 | 21 | 0.01 | 18 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 9 SSNs | 19 | 0.003 | 1 | 0.001 | 0 | 0.00 | 10 | 0.004 | 8 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.00 |
| 10 SSNs | 25 | 0.004 | 6 | 0.003 | 5 | 0.01 | 4 | 0.002 | 10 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.00 |
| Total | 645,028 | | 171,564 | | 91,013 | | 235,902 | | 146,062 | | 487 | 0.00 |

*Note.* 94,821 total social security numbers were missing from the NSOR dataset. North Carolina provided no SSN information for any offenders; Washington provided SSN data for only 181 offenders. The following states/territories reported no or only one piece of SSN data: Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington DC, Georgia, Hawaii, Washington, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.

## Additional Data Analysis Comparisons:  Regional

Additional analyses were performed in several key areas of the NSOR dataset, including a basic count of the number of offenders reported to be sex predators, as shown in Table 6.5.  Not all states reported this information.

CIMIP completed an analysis on the sex offenders' legal status:  if, at the time of data collection, an offender was in compliance with SORNA guidelines or if s/he had absconded.  Again, many states did not provide this information.  Table 6.6 presents these results.

| Table 6.5.  Regional Sex Predator Count Based on Available NSOR Data | |
| --- | --- |
| Region | Number of Sex Predators |
| Midwest | 15,918 |
| Northeast | 3,516 |
| South | 20,694 |
| West | 1,405 |
| Territory | 3 |
| Total Number of Offenders | 41,536 |

| Table 6.6. Regional Sex Offender Compliance Count Based on Available NSOR Data | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Region | Legal Status | | | Total Number of Offenders |
| | Compliant | Abscond | No Data | |
| Midwest | 85,404 | 2,630 | 83,530 | 171,564 |
| Northeast | 52,259 | 848 | 37,906 | 91,013 |
| South | 207,966 | 5,349 | 22,587 | 235,902 |
| West | 53,702 | 1,200 | 91,160 | 146,062 |
| Territory | 466 | 21 | 0 | 487 |
| Total Number of Offenders | 399,797 | 10,048 | 235,183 | 645,028 |

# Chapter 7
# Prediction of Sex Offender Identity Manipulation

ID Analytics provides credit and identity risk solutions to financial institutions, credit card issuers, retailers, telecommunication providers, auto and mortgage lenders, and the government by using advanced technology to identify certain consumer behaviors that might lead to identity theft or manipulation.   By using this technology, ID Analytics tested and built a predictive analytical model to assess SO identity manipulation for this project by using the NSOR database received from the FBI.

The model that was developed by ID Analytics was entitled the SO Score.   Like the CIMIP analysis, it was based on 2009 data from the NSOR.  The SO Score used the proprietary database of over 1.1 billion unique identity elements updated on a real-time basis that is utilized by ID Analytics ID Score$^{©}$ and ID Analytics ID Network$^{©}$, a predictive identity fraud score that is used by its corporate customers (See Appendix B on ID Analytics and Its ID Network).

By using the SO Score model, ID Analytics identified a number of significant different patterns in the database that might indicate fraudulent activity.   Those offenders who had questionable patterns of behavior based on their SO Score had similar activities, such as:
- Not living at their registered address;
- Substantially manipulated their identities based on data comparison;
- Had multiple unique, separate identities;
- Are linked to other risky or fraudulent identities; and
- Are associated with a large number of different identity characteristics, such as multiple names, social security numbers (SSN), and dates of birth (DOB).

According to the information from the SO Score, it appears that large numbers of offenders on the NSOR database may be manipulating their identities to avoid detection.  Of the 569,325 SO identities in the study, 16.6%  appeared to be engaged in identity manipulation of some kind.  The following sections outline the examination and results of the data.

# Data

The data utilized by ID Analytics for analysis were the registered offender's social security numbers, names, addresses, phone numbers, and dates of birth, which will be referred to as SNAPD in future references.   The following are the characteristics followed by ID Analytics for the SO Score analysis:

- Total number of records: 791,840
- Total number of suppressed records (expired registrations): 196,118
- Total number of available records: 595,722
- Removed Guam, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and "Invalid State Codes" because they introduced some distortion of the statistics and the number of SOs was small
- Final count of SOs in the study: 569,325
- Total number of fields: 1,701
- Total number of blank fields: 1,208
- Total number of fields with "some" information: 493
- Total Unique FBI numbers: 510,859
- Total number of expanded SNAPD combinations: 1,882,758

There are some issues with these data:

- There was no time stamp to indicate when the offender information was entered into the database.  Due to this fact, there was no way to trace a historical tracking element for behavior patterns in the identity element of the sex offender.
- There was only one field for address, while there were ninety-nine fields for name aliases.
- NSOR currently stores ZIP code as a numeric field that allows leading zeros to be dropped as a data element.
- The file contains invalid state abbreviations such as ON, OS, OT, AA, AB, AE, AF, AP, AS, AT and AV.
- The data contained numerous fields for items physical characteristics that identify the offender, such as presence of tattoos, boat registration, etc., yet none of these fields contained any data.
- All alpha "O" in some fields, such as the "Address" field, were converted to numeric "0" (zeros).  For example, "1600 Old Post Road" was "1600 0ld P0st R0ad." This feature made it impossible, without complex conversion, to match to other databases.

# Findings

## *Identity Elements and Establishing the Unique Identity of the Individual*

Approximately 42% of the sex offender registrants on the NSOR file had some type of multiple identity elements, such as more than one name, Social Security number (SSN), or date of birth (DOB).   ID Analytics termed these records "combinations."   It the sex offender had two names, four SSNs, and one DOB on the record and the ID Analytics data, the registrant was deemed to have eight combinations.

Table 7.1 represents the possible identity combinations that may occur with an eight element combination pattern.  Table 7.2 shows the breakdown of SNAPD combinations that were found based on the number of data element combinations.  Table 6.2 indicates that 42.26% of the registered sex offenders have more than one SNAPD combination.

Based on the combination of identifying data elements derived from NSOR and utilizing the ID Analytics database, a mapping of the "real" unique identity of the sex offender.  Figure 7.1  is an example of an individual who had 462 combinations of identity elements.  Based on actual data, this particular sex offender used 11 different names, 7 different SSNs, and 6 different DOBs.   The circle indicates the "real" identity elements for the individual.

| Table 7.1.  Identity Combinations | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Names** | **SSNs** | **DOBs** | **Combinations** |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 2 | 4 | 1 | 8 |
| 9 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| 4 | 3 | 2 | 24 |

| Table 7.2.  SNAPD Combinations of Sex Offenders | | |
|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| **Number of Combinations** | **Frequency** | **Percent** |
| 1 | 328,747 | 57.74 |
| 2 | 88,947 | 15.62 |
| 3 | 45,545 | 8.00 |
| 4 | 34,701 | 6.10 |
| 5 | 11,541 | 2.03 |
| 6 | 16,648 | 2.92 |
| 7 | 3,271 | 0.57 |
| 8 | 9,644 | 1.69 |
| 9 | 2,380 | 0.42 |

Utilizing this type of identity combination, ID Analytics used its proprietary identity resolution technology to identify the unique identity for each record on the NSOR file.   This was done due to the fact there was no one "true" identity for the sex offender indicated on the database.  This was a relatively simple process for 58% of the database since most of the records had one name, one DOB and one SSN.  For the remaining 42%, ID Analytics was able to analyze the multiple data elements and in combination with the identity resolution technology was able to identify the true and unique identity of the individual.

**Figure 7.1.  Identity Combinations**

ID Analytics was able to assign one unique identity key to about 86.6% of the NSOR records.  An additional 0.99% of the records had more than one unique identity key indicating that these individuals appeared to be manipulating their identities.  The total percentage of records assigned an identity key in the study was 86.57%.  Based on prior experience in identifying fraudulent behavior, this was determined to be a lower than average percentage.  Typically, ID Analytics would expect the number of unique identity keyed identities to be greater than 90%.  This number, however, generally applies to a normal or typical population.

As a result, ID Analytics performed a test with the file from the State of Florida to investigate why such a low number of accounts were assigned an identity key.  The Florida file contained the current status of the sex offender, such as "incarcerated", "deported", "deceased", etc., which might help to explain the low identity key percent.  After keying the identities for Florida sex offenders and analyzing the current status, ID Analytics learned that about 66% of the identities that could not be assigned an identity key had the status code indicating they were incarcerated, deported, or otherwise not able to be supervised.

It seems obvious that sex offenders that are incarcerated, deceased, and deported would not be attempting to manipulate their identities and would prove to be difficult to key because the address is that of the prison or jail and the individual has not had any credit activity in the recent past. From this analysis, we concluded that about 8.2% of the 12.44% sex offenders who were not assigned an identity key had a status that would explain why the identity keying was not successful in their case. If those identities were excluded from the potential pool to be assigned an identity key, then the percent of records keyed is well above 90%.

## Determining the Identity Manipulation Score

It is important to point out that currently on the NSOR database the sex offender "current status" field was missing. Without this type of information, the probability that the amount of sex offenders who are manipulating their identity is greater. As an example, incarcerated sex offenders have less incentive and opportunity to manipulate their identity than those who are in community-based sex offender programs. Therefore, if 15 out of 100 who are registered appear to have manipulated their identity, the current percentage would be 15% of offenders manipulating their identity. However, if 35 of those offenders were currently incarcerated, the true percentage would have to be calculated at 15/65; therefore, the total offenders manipulating their identity would rise to approximately 23%. The information that is lacking in this key field likely caused the results of this study to be conservative and to underestimate the true percent of non-incarcerated sex offenders that manipulate their identity.

Once the real identity of the sex offender was determined, ID Analytics assigned a "Sex Offender Score" (SO score). This score would enable analysts to determine—based on data from the ID Analytics Network of 1.1 billion unique identity elements, ID Analytics ID Score, the NSOR data file and criteria developed by ID Analytics—who is manipulating their identity.

Those who were identified as having "bad" scores based on a profile developed by ID Analytics. This scoring pattern tended to identify those who were most likely manipulating their identity had a high score according to the data. Those who had high scores and were in the high risk category had the following characteristics:

- In the ID Analytics database, there is credit, phone and utility activity at an address other than the SOs registered address.
- SO used the registered address in the past, but is currently using an address other than the registered address.
- There is high identity fraud risk as determined by ID Analytics data and the ID Score at the address currently being used by the sex offender, whether that is the registered address or a different address from the registered address.
- Sex offender has links to high-risk identity fraud activity at the current address as determined by ID Analytics data and the ID Score.
- Sex offender is not residing at the registered address.
  - Registered address not the most recent used by sex offender.

73

- o Sex offender most recent activity links to an address different from the one on file.
  - o Sex offender has no history using the registered address, but has recent activity (within the last 6 months) at a different address.
- Identity manipulation activity includes:
  - o Identity resolution technology determined that, from the NSOR record, the study created more than one identity key and therefore the sex offender is operating under multiple identities.
  - o Sex offender had a high ID Score with links to risky identity fraud identities.
  - o Suspiciously, high numbers of identity elements are associated with an NSOR record.

As seen in Figure 7.2, a low score shows a benign risk of identity theft.   ID Analytics determined that the sex offender cut-off score to be 470.   After this point, an offender was deemed of high risk of utilizing identity manipulation.   The blue line indicates that the entire population of sex offenders has a lower distribution score than those sex offenders who fall above the distribution line and determined to be "bad," or more than likely manipulating their identity.   There is a clear delineation between these two segments of the sex offender population, therefore it made it easy to differentiate between the manipulators and the non-manipulators.



**Figure 7.2. Sex Offender Score Distribution**

Based on these elements, some of the key characteristics found from the findings done by ID Analytics include:

- The SO score calculates the likelihood that the sex offender has manipulated their identity on the NSOR file and is likely not compliant with registration requirements.
- The "bad" rate identified by ID Analytics was 16.6%.
- The score clearly delineates two sets of sex offenders, those that do manipulate their identity (bad) and those that likely do not manipulate their identity.
- The score provides "reason codes" for law enforcement to know how the identity is being manipulated or compromised.
- If the sex offender appears to be residing at an address other than the registered address (shadow address), the score system, using the ID Analytics database, can provide local law enforcement with the shadow address.

## *Key Findings Based on Analysis*

Based on analysis from the NSOR database and the identity resolution technology, ID Analytics determined there were shared characteristics of the sex offender "bad" population. The key finding is that most of this sector of the sex offender populace has manipulated their identity, such that ID Analytics has determined that they have created/linked to another identity.

As explained earlier, ID Analytics used the "identity key" system, which is a unique person identifier number, which was assigned to each sex offender to map their activities and give the ability to trace the identity elements the offender, was utilizing. By using the identity resolution technology, the system was able to analyze the SNAPD combinations per record and determine that some offenders had manipulated their identity to such a degree that the individual had multiple identity keys based on mapping of the NSOR records. ID Analytics can determine the "true" person, but in various cases, characteristics of the "bad" offenders were identified.

Sex offenders, like fraudsters, appear to perpetrate various types of identity fraud including familial and synthetic identity fraud. The definition of "familial fraud" is as the use of a family member's personally identifiable information or PII in an attempt to defraud. The sex offender may not intend to commit familial fraud as a way to obtain credit to commit a crime, but as a way to hide or abscond, from the authorities. "Synthetic fraud" is the altering of personally identifiable information in an attempt to gain access to credit. Sex offenders appear to commit synthetic identity fraud in order to obtain credit. It is believed that creating synthetic identities enables sex offenders to take on an identity, which does not link to their tarnished identity and does not explicitly overlap with a different, real person's identity (the signature of identity theft).

Figure 7.3 illustrates a case example that was extracted using the NSOR file and ID Analytics database of identities. This is a circumstance where a sex offender had three hundred combinations of identity elements. At one time or another, this particular sex

offender used ten different names, six different SSNs and five different DOBs. The "real" identity is composed of the identity elements inside the circle.



**Figure 7.3 Sex Offender Using Suspicious Number Identity Element Combinations**

Another characteristic that some of the sex offender "bad" population shared was that they have a history of using many different identity elements, which indicates that the individual is manipulating their identity. While these offenders who have been identified as "bad" have not manipulated their identity enough to result in another identity key, it is still clear that these individuals are disguising their identity for personal reasons.

It was also discovered that some of the sex offenders were registered at one address but were actually residing at another address. In this instance, the individual is considered an absconder. In many case studies, it has been observed that many of these offenders live in close vicinity to their registered address. Although not clear, the absconded sex offender may be living close to give them the ability to respond to law-enforcement inquiries while at the same time afford them a sense of privacy from the community.

ID Analytics employed the SO Score to the entire NSOR file, and then ranked offenders from high-risk score to low-risk score. The cut-off score of 470 was then used to define which individuals appeared to be manipulating their identity. Those who had a high score were deemed as identity manipulators, or "bads."

During the course of this study, one particular nationally covered case of sex offender identity manipulation emerged. In one celebrated case of sex offender identity manipulation, a convict named Frank Kuni changed his name to Jamie Shepard and was able to obtain a job as a U.S. Census worker in New Jersey. Kuni was recognized by a mom (with her young son present) after he knocked on the door of her Pennsauken home, and he was later sentenced to three years in prison. Kuni's case attracted national headlines because of the fear it created surrounding temporary Census workers (Berman and Netter, 2010). Retroactively, ID Analytics reviewed Kuni's NSOR information and applied the Score for a period prior to his arrest as a result of his application for the Census position. The analysis found the following: 1) Kuni's SO score was 719; 2) Although his valid SO address was in Pennsauken, NJ, he had a second residence in Versailles, Kentucky under the name of Michael Flynn; and 3) Kuni had 5 name aliases, 3 SSNs, and 4 DOBs associated with his NSOR record.

For the general database those sex offenders scoring above the cut-off score of 470 (i.e., "bads") were separated into state counts. As seen in Table 7.3, Louisiana was considered the top state for the percentage of sex offenders classified as "bads." Not only did Louisiana have the largest number of sex offender bad count, but also it was linked with a high identity fraud risk.

| State | Population | Number of Sex Offenders | Number of Bad Sex Offenders | % of Sex Offenders Classified as Bad |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Louisiana | 4,492,076 | 763 | 5,085 | 66.6 |
| Washington DC | 599,657 | 125 | 399 | 31.8 |
| Nevada | 2,643,085 | 392 | 1,163 | 29.7 |
| Tennessee | 6,296,254 | 12,140 | 3,494 | 28.8 |
| Delaware | 885,122 | 322 | 840 | 26.1 |
| New Jersey | 8,707,739 | 13,689 | 3,417 | 25.0 |
| Mississippi | 2,951,996 | 487 | 1,196 | 24.5 |
| Rhode Island | 1,053,209 | 153 | 352 | 23.0 |
| Texas | 24,752,302 | 47,350 | 10,717 | 22.6 |
| New Mexico | 2,009,671 | 322 | 719 | 22.3 |
| Total | 54,391,111 | 98,848 | 27,382 | 27.7 |
| National | 30,697,655 | 569,325 | 94,515 | 16.6 |

**Table 7.3. Highest 10 States in Terms of Bad Rates**

Table 7.4 shows the 10 lowest states in terms of "bad" rates by sex offenders; that is, the states where there seemed to be the lowest percentage of identity manipulation that was being used by sex offenders. As indicated before, there were sex offenders who are manipulating their identity and not residing at their registered address. According to the analysis, 50% of those individuals who were indicated as "bad" did not appear to be living at their registered address. Additionally, of that 50%, 85% appeared to be living in the same state, while 15% were living in another state.

For this analysis, ID Analytics identified "Intrastate Movers" and "Interstate Movers." Intrastate Movers appear to be residing or to have activity at an address in the same state where they are registered, but not at the registered address. Interstate Movers are those who abscond across the state lines.

**Table 7.4  Lowest 10 States in Terms of Bad Rates**

| State | Population | Number of Sex Offenders | Number of Bad Sex Offenders | % of Sex Offenders Classified as Bad |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Michigan | 9,969,727 | 38,726 | 4,346 | 11.2 |
| Hawaii | 1,295,178 | 222 | 274 | 11.0 |
| North Carolina | 9,380,884 | 13,284 | 1,437 | 10.8 |
| Vermont | 621,760 | 192 | 200 | 10.4 |
| New Hampshire | 1,324,575 | 247 | 249 | 10.1 |
| Virginia | 7,882,590 | 15,945 | 1,536 | 9.6 |
| Florida | 18,537,969 | 40,522 | 3,899 | 9.6 |
| Minnesota | 5,266,214 | 14,514 | 1,335 | 9.2 |
| Washington | 6,664,195 | 20,594 | 1,859 | 9.1 |
| Wisconsin | 5,654,774 | 18,232 | 1,297 | 7.1 |
| Total | 66,597,866 | 168,434 | 16,402 | 9.7 |
| National | 30,697,655 | 569,325 | 94,515 | 16.6 |

Per Table 7.5, almost 91% of the sex offenders living at a shadow address lived less than 40 miles from their registered address, about 37% appear to be residing at a shadow address in the same ZIP code as the registered address.  However, about 4% of the bad sex offenders described as Intrastate Movers appear to be residing more than 100 miles from their registered address.

## Table 7.5.  Sex Offender Intrastate Movers – Distance Living from Registered Address

| Distance | Count | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 14,741 | 37.01 | 37.01 |
| 1 | 1,162 | 2.92 | 39.93 |
| 2 | 1,982 | 4.98 | 44.90 |
| 3 | 1,916 | 4.81 | 49.71 |
| 4 | 1,713 | 4.30 | 54.01 |
| 5 | 1,591 | 3.99 | 58.01 |
| 6 | 1,426 | 3.58 | 61.59 |
| 7 | 1,212 | 3.04 | 64.63 |
| 8 | 1,083 | 2.72 | 67.35 |
| 9 | 1,027 | 2.58 | 69.93 |
| < 20 | 5,460 | 13.71 | 83.64 |
| < 30 | 1,870 | 4.69 | 88.33 |
| < 40 | 965 | 2.42 | 90.76 |
| < 50 | 608 | 1.53 | 92.28 |
| < 60 | 424 | 1.06 | 93.35 |
| < 70 | 316 | 0.79 | 94.14 |
| < 80 | 314 | 0.79 | 94.93 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| < 90 | 226 | 0.57 | 95.50 |
| < 100 | 181 | 0.45 | 95.95 |
| ≥ 100 | 1,613 | 4.05 | 100.00 |
| Total | 39,830 | 100.00 | ---- |

Table 7.6 shows the average distance sex offenders are moving when absconding across state lines.  As indicated, the majority of the sex offenders who move across state lines move more than 500 miles from their registered address.

**Table 7. 6.  Sex Offender Interstate Movers – Distance Living from Registered Address**

| Distance | Count | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|
| < 10 | 232 | 3.26 | 3.26 |
| < 20 | 266 | 3.73 | 6.99 |
| < 30 | 157 | 2.20 | 9.19 |
| < 40 | 104 | 1.46 | 10.65 |
| < 50 | 90 | 1.26 | 11.91 |
| < 60 | 80 | 1.12 | 13.04 |
| < 70 | 78 | 1.09 | 14.13 |
| < 80 | 51 | 0.72 | 14.85 |
| < 90 | 65 | 0.91 | 15.76 |
| < 100 | 66 | 0.93 | 16.69 |
| < 500 | 2,157 | 30.27 | 46.95 |
| < 1,000 | 1,841 | 25.83 | 72.79 |
| ≥ 1,000 | 1,939 | 27.21 | 100.00 |
| Total | 7,126 | 100.00 | ---- |

Table 7.7 lists the six states that have the highest rate of sex offenders where individuals are registered in one state, but appear to be residing in another.  Because Nebraska has so few sex offenders, the statistics might not be a true representation.   The national

average for sex offenders that live in one state, but are registered in another is 1.24% or 7,126 individuals.  Table 7.8 demonstrates the six states that have the lowest rate of offenders that appear to be residing in one state, but registered in another.

ID Analytics analyzed which states had sex offenders moving into them and which states had these individuals moving out of them. Two terms must be defined to identify the Interstate Movers:
- "Inflow" – Those sex offenders who were registered in one state but have moved into the inflow state.
- "Outflow"– Those sex offenders who are registered in the outflow state but appear to have manipulated their identity and  be living in another state.

For example, if an individual has manipulated their identity and is registered in New York but appears to be living in Pennsylvania, they are counted as an outflow from New Jersey and an inflow to Pennsylvania.

| Table 7.7.  Six Highest States in Percent of Interstate Movers | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Total Count | Outflow | % Outflow | Inflow | % Inflow | % Mover |
| Nebraska | 110 | 9 | 8.18 | 38 | 34.55 | 42.73 |
| Washington DC | 1,255 | 101 | 8.05 | 35 | 2.79 | 10.84 |
| Nevada | 3,922 | 107 | 2.73 | 148 | 3.77 | 6.50 |
| Maryland | 6,573 | 152 | 2.31 | 165 | 2.51 | 4.82 |
| New Mexico | 3,221 | 66 | 2.05 | 81 | 2.51 | 4.56 |
| New Jersey | 13,689 | 546 | 3.99 | 71 | 0.52 | 4.51 |
| National | 569,325 | 7,087 | 1.24 | 7,049 | 1.24 | 2.48 |

| Table 7.8. Six Lowest States in Percent of Interstate Movers | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Total Count | Outflow | % Outflow | Inflow | % Inflow | % Mover |
| Arkansas | 2,389 | 13 | 0.54 | 24 | 1.00 | 1.55 |
| Ohio | 17,243 | 73 | 0.42 | 190 | 1.10 | 1.53 |
| North Dakota | 1,247 | 4 | 0.32 | 15 | 1.20 | 1.52 |
| Wisconsin | 18,232 | 106 | 0.58 | 146 | 0.80 | 1.38 |
| Massachusetts | 14,498 | 10 | 0.07 | 97 | 0.67 | 0.74 |
| Minnesota | 14,514 | 24 | 0.17 | 83 | 0.57 | 0.74 |
| National | 569,325 | 7,087 | 1.24 | 7,049 | 1.24 | 2.48 |

Table 7.9 demonstrates the ten states that have the highest percent of offenders that appear to manipulate their identities moving into them. Table 7.10 shows the ten states that have the lowest percent of SOs that appear to manipulate their identities moving into them. It is important to consider that the total of Interstate Movers is a small number compared to the total number of offenders nationally who are identified as appearing to manipulate their identity, or who are classified as bad.

## Table 7.9.  Highest 10 Inflow States

| State | Count | % Outflow |
|---|---|---|
| Nebraska | 38 | 34.55 |
| Nevada | 148 | 3.77 |
| Pennsylvania | 260 | 2.91 |
| Washington DC | 35 | 2.79 |
| New Mexico | 81 | 2.51 |
| Maryland | 165 | 2.51 |
| Kansas | 101 | 2.26 |
| Kentucky | 130 | 2.12 |
| Utah | 65 | 2.12 |
| Idaho | 71 | 2.11 |

| Table 7.10. Lowest 10 Inflow States | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| State | Count | % Inflow |
| Oregon | 135 | .87 |
| Wisconsin | 46 | .80 |
| South Dakota | 22 | .79 |
| Connecticut | 43 | .78 |
| Michigan | 280 | .72 |
| Vermont | 13 | .68 |
| Massachusetts | 97 | .67 |
| Maine | 19 | .58 |
| Minnesota | 83 | .57 |
| New Jersey | 71 | .52 |

Table 7.11 demonstrates the ten states that have the highest percent of offenders that appear to be manipulating their identities moving out of the state.  Table 7.12 shows the ten states that have the lowest percent of SOs that appear to manipulate their identities moving out of the state.

| Table 7.11. Highest 10 Outflow States | | |
|---|---|---|
| **State** | **Count** | **% Outflow** |
| Nebraska | 9 | 8.18 |
| Washington DC | 101 | 8.05 |
| New Jersey | 546 | 3.99 |
| Nevada | 107 | 2.73 |
| Rhode Island | 41 | 2.68 |
| Louisiana | 199 | 2.61 |
| Oregon | 375 | 2.43 |
| Mississippi | 114 | 2.34 |
| South Carolina | 180 | 2.32 |
| Maryland | 152 | 2.31 |

**Table 7.12.  Lowest 10 Outflow States**

| State | Count | % Outflow |
|-------|-------|-----------|
| Texas | 385 | 0.81 |
| California | 427 | 0.76 |
| Wisconsin | 106 | 0.58 |
| Arkansas | 13 | 0.54 |
| Pennsylvania | 38 | 0.43 |
| Ohio | 73 | 0.42 |
| North Dakota | 4 | 0.32 |
| Florida | 95 | 0.23 |
| Minnesota | 24 | 0.17 |
| Massachusetts | 10 | 0.07 |

# Chapter 8

# Validating the Scoring Model and Developing a
# Real-time Alerting System for Monitoring Compliance

While Chapter 6 proposed a method for locating "lost" sex offenders and Chapter 7 proposed a method for predicting sex offender manipulation, this chapter presents the results of an effort to validate the proposed method using state data and how the model can be used by state law enforcement tracking systems

### Validating the Scoring Model for Future Use

We chose one jurisdiction in Florida as the initial validation site. This jurisdiction is just outside Orlando and covers Osceola and Volusia Counties. This site was selected due to our ability to access easily the state sex offender registry database and our contacts with the local task force. At this site, we examined the total population of registered sex offenders who were classified as high risk for identity manipulation (n = 22) and a random sample of moderate- and low-risk offenders (n = 22).
Validation required verification of the information provided for each high risk offender by ID Analytics along with a similar review of information for the moderate- and low-risk offenders. In addition, offenders were classified as high risk if they exhibited one or more of the following:

- Not living at the registered address;
- Had substantially manipulated his/her identity;
- Had multiple, unique, separate identifiers;
- Is liked to other risky or fraudulent identities; and
- Is associated with a large number of different identity characteristics, such as multiple names, SSNs, and/or DOBs.

In conjunction with monitoring/location personnel from the sample jurisdiction, researchers reviewed the ID Analytics risk profile information for accuracy.  We examined both the SO score and the IM (Identity Manipulation) score for all selected offenders. Specifically, we looked to see if the ID Analytics system provided the following:

- New address location;
- Evidence of manipulated identity;
- Identification of unique, separate identities;
- Details on how an offender is linked to other risky or fraudulent identities; and
- Evidence of a large number of different identity characteristics, such as multiple names, SSNs, and DOBs.

Old data was responsible for yielding false alarms in 19 cases. Of the 22 moderate- and low-risk offenders, none were found to be using identity manipulation. Of the 22 high risk  offenders identified, 3 were found to be using identity manipulation, multiple SSNs used and 5 cases were identified that involve identity manipulation, name-based.  Thus, the validation of the scoring model revealed that, 8 out of the 22 identified high risk offenders (36%) were either showing signs of trying to manipulate their identities or are actually manipulating their identities. Note that we were not able to assess the accuracy of the predictions (i.e., % correctly predicted and verified as ID manipulators, or true positives).  Nor were we able to assess the extent of false positives (i.e., % not verified as identity manipulators).  Similarly, we cannot assess whether offenders with low scores are true or false negatives.

The result of the validation testing (36% accuracy for high risk offenders) can be significant depending on what statistical model one is using for the significance test. No model (no matter how advanced the technology is) will be able to predict 100% of what one is testing.  Assuming an even chance of predicting identity manipulation based upon no background evidence risk, the 36% accuracy rate of predicting the small sample of Florida high risk offenders with certainty is noteworthy.  One can also consider the timing of the model test (i.e., a follow-up of 2 years or 4 years). It may be useful to consider some remaining sex offenders may be put under close scrutiny because although manipulation may not be evident yet, they may be manipulators in the future because they share the same strong indicators. Given the validation results, We offer that the optimization of the original model be used primarily as the foundation for a system  to deliver a stream of real-time noncompliance alerts of registered sex offenders for law enforcement/monitoring agencies to follow up on to separate out false positives and concentrate on those offenders showing evidence of identity manipulation and identity manipulation attempts. This could be useful in addressing early actions that could be precursors to absconding or identity actual absconding through identity manipulation.

## Developing a System for Real Time Noncompliance Alerts

In this next section, we describe the ID Analytics' process for attempting to generate and deliver a stream of real-time noncompliance alerts for registered sex offenders. This process was examined for the State of Florida because of (1) the ability to collect the required data and (2) the agreement made by Florida law-enforcement officials to participate in the evaluation of these results. As previously mentioned, ID Analytics observes about one-third to one-half of all U.S. applications for credit cards, cell phones, and other financial products. The real-time noncompliance alerts are generated by the observation of a registered sex offender applying for such a commercial product using an address different from his or her registered address.

A special data file was built allowing the generation of these alerts, which produced about 18,000 alerts across an 18-month time span, or about 10 alerts per day (A subset of 1,846 of the alerts was analyzed by Florida law-enforcement officials to advise on the usefulness of the alerts). It was discovered that there are many types of alerts, and these alerts were of varying importance. Some of the most promising alerts were due to activity of sex offenders registered as absconders; that is, unknown locations. The real-time alert system was envisioned to have the ability to find such "hiding" people by monitoring the activity of a large flow of commercial data. Additionally, many alerts are simply sex offenders living in places where they are not registered, which is also likely of substantial interest to law enforcement.

## Methods

This stage of the project began with the goal of building a process that would help law enforcement identify noncompliant sex offenders. The first approach was to build a statistical algorithm to examine the national list of registered sex offenders and, using ID Analytics' proprietary ID Network data, to score this list and assign a noncompliance score to each registrant. The list was sorted by this score and, at the top of the list, the most likely noncompliant was examined by law enforcement.

The execution of this project required the national list of registered sex offenders, which was received by the Department of Justice in January 2010. The next step was to evaluate the results of this algorithmic noncompliance score, which was performed in conjunction with Florida law enforcement in January 2011. This meeting revealed that many of the high-scoring people were identified merely as a result of the data being old by the time of scoring and evaluation. It also became clear that the best approach to this problem is the use of a real-time alerting service, which has been invented previously by ID Analytics.

To examine the efficacy of the capability of real-time alerting, ID Analytics required a longitudinal, up-to-date sex offender registration data list. By "up-to-date," it is meant that the registry information (e.g., name, address) is current at the time of being examined. We required a history of such current data that allowed the registration data to be accurate at the time. Such a dataset was

not available, so data was collected using Florida's on-line sex offender registration information (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).  Such data was collected starting in March 2011 by downloading and saving it every Monday. Data collection was completed in August 2012. There were several  weeks when the data were not properly downloaded, causing some of the data to be up to 2 weeks old rather than current at the time of the alert.  This was adjusted for by looking forward at the registered information at the next data download. Thus, if an address was used that was not seen at the time, the address was examined to determine if the new address was used as the registered address at the next download.

The last stage of this project involved a secured agreement with Florida law-enforcement officials to examine a set of noncompliance alerts generated by us using the dataset we collected.  This stage began in September 2012 and generated the noncompliance alerts to be sent to law enforcement.

Data was collected from 59 weekly files from the 18-month period from March 7, 2011, to September 9, 2012.  On average, each file contained 57,306 registered sex offenders.  The fields contained in these files and their average field populations are shown in Table 6.8.  Some fields are always populated (e.g., first and last name, demographic information), whereas other fields are rarely populated (e.g., transient and temporary location information).

To match this registry data with the ID Network data, we required the application of a common person number to both datasets.  ID Analytics has such a unique person identifier—called the IDA Identity Number—by which it does people-centric data tracking in their corporate dataset.  Because ID Analytics could not assign the Florida Person Number to its internal data, its only recourse was to do data matching to assign an IDA Identity Number to each Florida registrant.  Due to less than adequate information in critical fields (especially SSN), this process could not be completed for all registrants.  Further, this lacking information meant that ID Analytics' IDA Identity Number was infrequently but sometimes wrong.  To help with this problem, the last four digits of the SSN were returned so that law enforcement (which does have access to the full SSN) can determine whether or not the IDA Identity Number was assigned correctly.

ID Analytics was able to assign an IDA Identity Number to 70.7% of people in the Florida registry, and it is this 70.7% of people for whom possible alerts could be generated.  With this process, ID Analytics was able to track 42,633 unique people.  A longitudinal file tracking each of these people over the study period was created, noting when their registration data changed.

ID Analytics extracted from their ID Network corporate data any events during the study period that seemed of interest.  Using the IDA Identity Number, ID Analytics extracted any seen events initiated by the registrant whose identity numbers were known.  This produced 49,722 applications for products or services from the 42,633 unique people over the 18-month study period.  For each of these applications, the following question was asked:  Is the address used on the application the same as either the current or a

previous address for that registrant in the Florida registry file?  If the answer was "yes," then this event was not of interest.  If the answer was "no," then this event represented a registered sex offender using an address that is different from the current registered address or a previously registered address.  These are events that likely will be of interest to law enforcement.


## Findings

Examining the 49,722 applications using this address-difference question, it was found that there were 18,035 alerts of interest over the 18-month time span.  From this set of alerts, information was further filtered, trying to exclude alerts not of interest to law enforcement.  With guidance from Florida law enforcement, 18,035 alerts was reduced to 1,844 alerts with at least one of the following characteristics:

- Most recent 6 months;
- Absconders;
- Transients applying with a non-transient address;
- Registered as out of state but applying with a Florida address; or
- Registered in Florida but applying out of state.

These 1,844 alerts were generated by 1,283 registrants, with some registrants having multiple applications.  Table 8.1 provides a sample from this set of alerts.  Table 8.2 provides the number of alerts and registrants by address type.

**Table 8.1  Example Noncompliance Alerts Showing the Difference between Registered Address and Address on Application**

| Person Number | Registered Address | Registered Zip5 | Registered State | Application Date | Application Address | Application Zip5 | Application State | Address Match Score | Application Type | SSN4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 46111 | 3271 N HOLIDAY DR | 34428 | FL | 20120310 | 8164 W DELATREE LN | 34428 | FL | 2 | 3 | XXXX |
| 67143 | DEPT OF CORRECTIONS | | FL | 20120310 | 3812 HOUSTON LAKE DR | 77581 | TX | 1 | 4 | XXXX |
| 70541 | 2302 W TENNESSEE ST | 32304 | FL | 20120310 | 812 RICHMOND ST APT 9 | 32304 | FL | 1 | 3 | XXXX |
| 72654 | DEPT OF CORRECTIONS | | FL | 20120310 | 4186 LOGAN DR | 30052 | GA | 1 | 3 | XXXX |
| 75146 | DEPORTED | 32327 | FL | 20120310 | 1255 W 53$^{RD}$ ST SPT 302 | 33012 | FL | 0 | 3 | XXXX |
| 54347 | 9243 SE 144$^{TH}$ PL | 34491 | FL | 20120311 | 3223 N 2$^{ND}$ ST | 52312 | WI | 1 | 4 | XXXX |
| 54945 | ABSCONDED | | FL | 20120311 | 6216 BREN MAR DR | 22312 | VA | 1 | 4 | XXXX |
| 68197 | DEPT OF CORRECTIONS | | FL | 20120311 | 5913 NW 15$^{TH}$ CT | 33313 | FL | 1 | 4 | XXXX |
| 69087 | ABSCONDED | | FL | 20120311 | 626 E LINCOLN WAY | 44432 | OH | 1 | 4 | XXXX |
| 71969 | 11232 SEAGLADE DR | 32507 | FL | 20120311 | 5443 GRANDE LAGOON CT | 32507 | FL | 2 | 4 | XXXX |
| 84751 | DEPT OF CORRECTIONS | | FL | 20120311 | 18802 W DIXIE HWY APT A3B | 22180 | FL | 0 | 3 | XXXX |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 29425 | 855 PALMETTO ST | 32206 | FL | 20120312 | 321 10TH ST S | 32250 | FL | 1 | 3 | XXXX |
| 35275 | 3560 US HWHY 17 N | 33880 | FL | 20120312 | 308 AVENUE X NE | 33881 | FL | 0 | 4 | XXXX |
| 36276 | ABSCONDED | | FL | 20120312 | 13 DIAMOND-WOOD CT | 94565 | CA | 1 | 2 | XXXX |
| 37076 | 6 TOREADOR | 34952 | FL | 20120312 | 4523 PLYMOUTH CT | 64110 | MO | 1 | 3 | XXXX |
| 39872 | TRANSIENT | 34243 | FL | 20120312 | 1675 55TH AVENUE CIR E | 34203 | FL | 0 | 7 | XXXX |
| 40451 | GASLIGHT AVE | 34690 | FL | 20120312 | 5905 RIDDLE RD | 34690 | FL | 2 | 2 | XXXX |
| 59542 | 5015 24TH AVE S LOT 2 | 33619 | FL | 20120312 | 2977 PONDEROSA RD | 28326 | NC | 0 | 3 | XXXX |
| 64601 | DEPT OF CORRECTIONS | | FL | 20120312 | 61 HIGHLAND | 42633 | KY | 1 | 3 | XXXX |

**Table 8.2. Number of Alerts and Registrants by Address Type**

| Registered Address Type | Number of Alerts | Number of People |
|---|---|---|
| County Jail | 15 | 13 |
| Absconded | 44 | 35 |
| Department of Corrections | 417 | 278 |
| Department of Children | 15 | 7 |
| Deported | 40 | 24 |
| Federal Bureau of Prisons | 11 | 8 |
| Out of State | 80 | 58 |
| Transient | 138 | 99 |
| ICE Custody | 1 | 1 |
| Other (Normal Address) | 1,083 | 792 |

The case in the first row of Table 8.1, for example, represents a noncompliance alert for person number 46111 in the Florida registry. This person's address registered address is different from the address given on his/her cell phone application. The application address is about three-quarters of a mile away from the registered address. The dataset—of which Table 8.2 is just a small sample—reveals a variety of address differences:

- Different addresses in the same Florida zip code;
- Different addresses and different zip codes in Florida;
- Registered in Florida but applying with a non-Florida address;
- Applying with a residential address but registered at a correctional facility;
- Applying with a residential address but registered as a transient;
- Applying with a residential address but registered as absconded; and

- Applying with a residential address but registered as deported.

It was observed that some alerts with different addresses in the same Florida zip code contained very similar addresses. Fifty-six of the alerts had a match score of 3, meaning that three out of four available address components matched. Many of these 56 cases could have been data entry errors, but they were included anyway because they could be intentional and thus of interest to law enforcement. However, alerts with match scores of 3 probably would not be of much interest to law enforcement generally.

Analyses covering 6 months identified 44 alerts from 36 absconded sex offenders, with some people have multiple alerts. More generally, in a 6-month period, analyses identified 1,283 people who appear to be violating their conditions of registration. This represents approximately 7 alerts per day.

The entire 18-month period generated 175 alerts from 110 absconders. This reveals that:
- Registrants can generate multiple alerts by applying for products using nonregistered addresses more than once; and
- Registrants sometimes change their registered addresses and can have multiple alerts even with address registration changes.

# Chapter 9
# Conclusions

This is the first study to estimate the number of sex offenders who use identity manipulation to evade tracking under current sex offender registration and notification laws. This study was guided by the assumption that "lost" sex offenders manipulate their identifying information as a means of avoiding detection by law enforcement. Our intention was to study the methods used by these lost offenders to evade registration requirements.

## Summary of Findings

We began by assessing the implementation of SORNA across the United States. Results presented in Chapter 3 revealed that state or local police are the most common agencies charged with registering sex offenders. All states collect the minimum information required by SORNA (e.g., name and aliases, date of birth, residence, physical location). Nearly all states collect professional license information, school information, text of registration offense, and criminal history information. SORNA also requires states to make public information about sex offenders. Over four-fifths of states maintain an on-line listing of all sex offenders, while less than two-thirds of states maintain a public web site listing sex offender absconders.

In an attempt to understand better how states address SORNA requirements, we conducted several site visits. This qualitative component, revealed a variety of difficulties associated with tracking sex offenders. For example, Connecticut's Sex Offender Registry Unit found that a large portion of its sex offenders list homeless shelters as their registered address. Because doing so allows the offender to remain transient, the use of homeless shelters as the registered address poses a major hurdle for law-enforcement tracking efforts. The site visit to Florida, moreover, identified another problem for law enforcement: Lack of cooperation when other states are notified that their sex offender absconders are residing in Florida.

We then conducted a national survey of subject-matter experts on existing strategies used to track and report on registered sex offenders; these results are presented in Chapter 5. More than 200 agencies representing 46 states participated. The majority of agencies have designated monitoring, apprehension, data management, and identification functions; however, relatively few agencies have a designated tiering function. The most common role played by individuals within these agencies is in registration compliance. It is most common for individuals to perform four of these functions. Combined, participating agencies are charged with monitoring 89,015 registered sex offenders, which is more than 10% of the national population of registered sex offenders. On average, agencies are responsible for monitoring 397 sex offenders with three full-time equivalent officers dedicated to this task.

In-person interviews and unannounced field visits are the most common verification and monitoring methods.  On average, agencies reported that 5% of their registered sex offenders are noncompliant.  According to responding agencies, indifference to and rebellion against registration requirements explains why so many offenders fail to comply.  Conversely, agencies believe that lack of understanding and unintentional oversight are the least common reasons for noncompliance.  In-state move is the most commonly cited precursor to failure to report, while identity theft is the least commonly cited precursor to failure to report.

Questions about tracking and apprehension strategies revealed that it is most common for noncompliant sex offenders and missing/absconded sex offenders to be located within one week.  Special apprehension units followed by the U.S. Marshall's Service were reported to be used the most frequently to locate and apprehend missing and absconded offenders.  Criminal history information and driver's license/RMV data files are the most common forms of data technology used to locate and apprehend missing and absconded offenders.  Follow-up questions indicate that respondents believe these to be the two most effective methods for locating offenders.  Last known address visits and probation/parole consultants are the most commonly employed contact-based approaches to locating missing offenders.  It is most common for agencies to use both data technology and contact-based approaches to locating offenders.

Chapter 6 further explored the problem of missing sex offenders.  Federal NSOR data indicate that the southern region of the United States has the highest number of absconders.  Working with ID Analytics, a real-time alerting system based on applications for consumer products and services was used to identity instances when a registered sex offender applied with an address different from his/her registered address.  In an 18-month period, this process generated 175 alerts from 110 absconders.

We shifted focus from missing sex offenders to sex offenders who manipulate their identity in Chapters 7 and 8.  Chapter 7 reported that about 42% of offenders in the NSOR dataset have multiple identity elements, such as more than one name, social security number, or date of birth.  A sex offender (SO) score was calculated to express the likelihood that a sex offender had manipulated his/her identity and likely is noncompliant with registration requirements.  More than 16% of sex offenders were found to have a high SO score, which suggests they are manipulating their identities.  Louisiana exhibited the highest percentage of registered sex offenders who appear to be manipulating their identities, while Wisconsin exhibited the lowest percentage of registered sex offenders who appear to be manipulating their identities.

In Chapter 8, a subsample of offenders examined in Chapter 7 was used to validate the sex offender manipulation scoring model.  The validation study revealed multiple false alarms due to old data.  However, the validation study revealed that 36 % of  the cases identified as "high risk" were cases that involved identity manipulation—either name- or SSN-based. Chapter 8 concludes by offering how the model can  be of assistance as an "alert system" to highlight cases warranting further investigation by law enforcement/monitoring agencies to determine the veracity of emerging "red flags" of possible identity manipulation.

## Discussion of Findings and Recommendations

Ultimately, one of the key utilities of the present study has been to explore the usefulness of real-time alerting systems for sex offender registration/monitoring purposes. Given the results presented in Chapters 6–8, we believe that a real-time noncompliance alerting system can help state and national law-enforcement officials focus their efforts on the most promising leads for recognizing sex offender manipulation to evade registration/monitoring systems. The result of the validation testing in chapter 8 (36% accuracy for high risk offenders) can be significant depending on what statistical model one is using for the significance test. No model (no matter how advanced the technology is) will be able to predict 100% of what one is testing. Assuming an even chance of predicting identity manipulation based upon no background evidence risk, the 36% accuracy rate of predicting the small sample of Florida high risk offenders with certainty is noteworthy. One can also consider the timing of the model test (i.e., a follow-up of 2 years or 4 years). It may be useful to consider some remaining sex offenders may be put under close scrutiny because although they were not caught yet, they may be likely in the future because they share the strong indicators. Chapter 9 explains how this information can become the foundation of a real –time alert system.

In closing, CIMIP and ID Analytics offer several recommendations to move research and knowledge forward about registered sex offenders and identity manipulation. Rather than use a risk scoring system that differentiates high- from low-risk for identity manipulation, consider developing and testing a continuous notification system more like a credit monitoring report for all registered sex offenders. Such a sex offender identity manipulation notification system could have applications to other offender groups that might be involved in identity manipulation, such as pretrial releases, probationers, and parolees. Future research efforts along these lines might want to consider both the necessity and cost-effectiveness of real-time monitoring of sex offender behavior in the community.

Additional recommendations for future research using the NSOR database include:
- Separate the functions of enforcement and awareness. Monitor the individual that has been identified as the one to focus on.
- Use identity-scoring technology to detect and monitor offender non-compliance and identity manipulation risk and send alerts to local jurisdictions.
  - Validate the Sex Offender Score by examining cases beginning from the highest scores.
  - Score offenders monthly and notify local jurisdictions of cases identity manipulation.
- Consider a multi-jurisdictional solution to enable crossing state lines for enforcement.
- As best as possible, identify and retain the original and true birth name, date of birth and Social Security numbers for all sex offenders on the NSOR file.
- Create single, common, persistent identity keys for all sex offenders for the ability to track the offender.

- Make it less onerous on states to participate by focusing on collecting and labeling key identity elements.
- Address problems in the data and data processes, such as:
  - Focus on key data fields, such as "current status" of the offender, and ensure they are completed properly and edited to ensure accuracy.
  - Initially capture "ground truth" original, true identity characteristics.
  - Use modern database and time stamp technology to store data.
  - Do not overwrite key fields (e.g., address, phone); instead, retain the history with time stamps.
  - Verify data accuracy and completeness on a field-by-field basis.
  - Capture identity and status changes in a timely manner.
  - Archive deported, deceased, expired, and "suppressed" records.
  - Remove duplicate and redundant identities.
- Conduct further research (e.g., cross-state moving, sex offender score validation) to help understand more detailed information on characteristics of those registered sex offenders throughout the U.S. contemplating exercising methods of altering their personal identification and/or otherwise "hiding in plain sight." Such research needs to dig deeper into sifting out how these offenders might somehow be different from other offenders. Do they tend to be concentrated in certain seriousness tiers? If so, why? Can this information help streamline registration/monitoring systems to make the wisest use of limited funds available for the administration of these systems. Why are certain states more affected by identity manipulation? Why are some, seemingly seen as "havens" for residency, while others tend to show signs of shifting offenders to other states? What part does state system effectiveness and coordination play in the general climate of registration/monitoring efficacy? And finally, what level of tolerance does the criminal justice system, and the general public, have for *any* percentage of the registered sex offender population being able to "hide in plain" site from sex offender tracking systems?

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# Appendix A

**Coding Scheme and Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (N=228*) as of Sept 23, 2010**

*Please note: the final review of the data set was conducted from June 18th to 22nd, 2011 and removed the case # 65173620 from Virginia State Police due to its duplication of the other case from the same agency. The removed case has over 20,000 registered sex offenders, which significantly affects the total number, average of the registered sex offenders, and other analyses of this study. Thus, all previous descriptive analysis was redone. The final N is **228** in the following analysis.

<u>Data</u> indicates the review on each variable and description of the coding process.
<u>Descriptive</u> indicates a general overview of descriptive statistics, such as frequency, percentage, Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and measurement of each variable. Some matrix questions also include cross-tabulation.

| Question # | Variable | Description | Coding/Label | N | % | Mean (SD) | Min/Max | Measure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Q1: State** | | | | | | | | |
| N=228 | State | State :The first 9 most frequently responded states | Texas<br>New York<br>North Carolina<br>Ohio<br>Utah<br>Washington<br>Louisiana<br>Minnesota<br>Oklahoma | 30<br>26<br>16<br>14<br>14<br>11<br>8<br>8<br>8 | 13.2<br>11.4<br>7<br>6.1<br>6.1<br>4.8<br>3.5<br>3.5<br>3.5 | | | Nominal |

<u>Data</u>: One missing response was replaced based on respondent's contact info.

Descriptive:
228 law enforcement agencies from 46 states participated in our National Law Enforcement Survey as of September 27, 2010.  Of the 228 law enforcement agencies, 135 (59%) agencies are primarily from 9 states.  The state with the most responses of law enforcement agencies is Texas (n=30, 13.2%).  The second highest response was from New York State (n=26, 11.4%).  Response ranking from the third to the sixth state ranged from 16 (7%) to 11 (4.8%) responses.   These are, in order, North Carolina, Ohio, Utah, and Washington State.  The other three states are Louisiana, Minnesota, and Oklahoma having 8 response each (3.5%).
**15 states have only one response (0.4%). Unfortunately, California is one of these. The other state that we are interested in, Florida, also had low responses (n=4, 1.7%).  Texas is used as an case study\*\***

| Q2: Jurisdiction | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=228 | Jurisdiction | Agency's Jurisdiction | 1=Local/Municipal<br>2=County<br>3=State | 80<br>133<br>15 | 35.1<br>58.3<br>6.6 | | 1/3 | Ordinal |

Data: The variable "jurisdiction" was coded using the following: 1=Local/Municipal, 2=County, 3=State.  One missing response was replaced based on respondent's contact info as in Q1 (the same person).

Descriptive: More than half of the agencies indicated their jurisdiction as county (n=133, 58.3%).  Local/Municipal jurisdiction had 80 responses (35.1%).  The jurisdiction of 15 responses was from the State category (6.6%).

| Q3:Agency Function (AF) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=227 | AF_DataMgt | Data Management | 1=Yes<br>0=No | 178 | 78.4% | .79 (.412) | 0/1 | Scale |
| | AF_Tier | Tier | | 39 | 17.2% | .18 (.381) | | |
| | AF_Monitor | Monitoring | | 205 | 90.3% | .90 (.296) | | |
| | AF_Identification | Identification | | 178 | 78.4% | .79 (.412) | | |
| | AF_Apprehension | Apprehension | | 202 | 89% | .89 (.313) | | |

Data: Five basic questions about the agency function are combined into matrix questions.  One missing response (the same individual: his response was included because he answered the remaining questions after the background information questions (Q1 to Q6).  Total valid responses therefore number 228.  "AF" (Agency Function) related variables are coded as 1=Yes and 0=No.

Descriptive: With regard to sex offender registration and notification, approximately 90% of participating law enforcement agencies monitor registration compliance (n=205, 90.3%) and apprehend missing registrants (n=202, 89%).  About 78% directly perform the functions of data entry and maintenance of registry information (n=178, 78.4%) and identifying

missing registrants (n=178, 78.4%). There were only 39 law enforcement agencies (17.2%) who indicated their function as assignment of registrant tier or level.

In terms of combination of the agency functions, 35 agencies (15.4%) perform all five functions while 111 agencies (48.7%) perform a combination of at least four functions.  Interestingly, 11 agencies (4.8%) concentrate only apprehension of missing registrants.

| Q5:Respondent Function (RF) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RF_DataMgt | Data Management | 1=Yes | | 131 | 57.7% | .57 (.495) | |
| | RF_Tier | Tier | 0=No | | 31 | 13.7% | .14 (.344) | 0/1 |
| N=227 | RF_Monitor | Monitoring | | | 159 | 70.0% | .70 (.460) | |
| | RF_Identification | Identification | | | 136 | 59.9% | .60 (.492) | Scale |
| | RF_Apprehension | Apprehension | | | 134 | 59.0% | .59 (.493) | |
| | RF_Supervision | Supervision | | | 149 | 65.6% | .66 (.475) | |

Data: Again, one response was missing.  "RF" (Respondent Function) related variables are also coded as 1=Yes and 0=No.

Descriptive: The roles of individual respondents vary in the agencies with regard to sex offender registration and notification.  Like "AF" (Agency Function), the most frequently cited role was monitoring registration compliance (n=159, 70%).  The next frequently cited role was supervision and unit management (n=149, 65.6%).  About 60% indicated their roles as identifying (n=136, 59.9%) and apprehending (n=134, 59%) missing registrants. 131 respondents (57.7%) claimed roles of data entry and maintenance of registry information. Within 40 agencies' functioning assignment of registrant tier or level, 31 respondents (13.7%) indicated their roles in this function of the agency.

120 respondents (52.6%) played roles in at least a combination of four functions.  Within them, 14 respondents (6.1%) performed all six functions personally.

| Q7: Number of Sex Offenders | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=218 | N_Sex_Offender | # of Sex Offenders | S=89015 | | 397.39 (1817.35) | 0/20000 | Scale |

Data: There are four missing cases; this variable is cleaned up in the following process.  For example, coded 95 if the respondent answered "90 to 100" of current registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction, or coded 100 if "over 100".  The actual value is also transformed 5 like verbal count "five".

Descriptive: The total number of registered sex offenders from the sample data is 89015.  According to the National Center of Missing and Exploited Children, currently 739,853 sex offenders are registered in the United States as of June

17, 2011.  Thus, the sample represents about 12% of the total population of US registered sex offenders.  The mean number of registered sex offenders in each responding agency is 397.39 while the median is 80.  One local agency responded that its current registered sex offender number was zero while two cases had over 15,000 sex offenders in their state jurisdiction.  The two cases (n=16,406 and 20,000 respectively) significantly affected Standard Deviation.

26 (11.9%) agencies indicated their current number is less than 10 registered sex offenders, while 10 (4.6%) indicated their number exceed over 1000 sex offenders in their jurisdiction.  99 (45.4%) agencies responded their number was over 10 but less than 100 sex offenders.  The remaining 83 (38.1%) agencies indicated their numbers of sex offenders was over 100 but less than 1,000 sex offenders.

The mean number of registered sex offenders in local jurisdiction is 222.76 while the county is 193.24.  The mean number of fifteen state jurisdictions is 3529.15.

| Q8: Number of Full Time Equivalent Officers | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=223 | N_FTE_Officers | # of FTE Officers | S=683.35 | | 3.06 (6.58) | 0/50 | Scale |

Data clean-up: As with the number of sex offender variable, the verbal expression of full time equivalent officers are transformed using mathematical expression (for example, 6 coded if the value of "six").  Please also note that one extreme value "40181" must be typo.  The other value 2200 is also considered as an extreme case, and we need to verify if this is number of its own office, or an estimate of the total number of agencies in New York.  Both cases directly affected the mean and standard deviation.  Thus, they are replaced manually as system missing.

Descriptive: The mean number of full time equivalent officers in 223 responding agencies is 3.06 while the median is 1.  31 (13.9%) agencies responded their current FTE was 0, indicating no designated officer for the sex offender management unit.  48.4% agencies (n=108) indicated their current FTE was 1, while 13% (n=29) indicated 2.  These two values equaled 61.4% of responder.  7.1% agencies (n=16) indicated their FTE was between 10 and 50.

| Q9: Percentages and Types of Sex Offender Supervision | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=212 | P_Parole | % of Parole Supervision | Percentage | 141 | 66.5% | 11.21 (18.12) | 0/100 | |
| N=220 | P_Probation | % of Probation Supervision | | 179 | 81.4% | 20.29 (19.39) | | |
| N=211 | P_No_Formal | % of No Formal Supervision | | 178 | 84.3% | 55.94 (31.31) | | |
| N=204 | P_Unknown | % of unknown supervision | | 60 | 29.4% | 12.18 (29.2) | | |

Heavy data clean up: Serious validity and reliability issues.  Many respondents put numbers instead of percentages.  I had to examine each item thoroughly to determine if all four items equaled 100%.  True "0" value and blank (missing value) are mix up in this category, even if blank in many cases indicates a true "0" value, as SPSS recognized them as missing values.  Through adding up the total of all four items to equal 100% and actual number of sex offender (comparing them to Q7) matching process, missing (unknown) values were replaced as true "0" value if they contained true 0 value .  In addition, the cases (#3,#35,#48,#54,#58,#102,#111,#116,#186,#189) using actual numbers were converted to percentage accordingly.

Descriptive:
1. Parole supervision: The mean percentage of parole supervision is 11.21 while standard deviation is 18.12.  141 (66.5%) agencies used parole supervision.  Within these agencies, 5 (2.2%) indicated all current registered sex offenders were under parole supervision.  71 (33.5%) agencies responded that none of current registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction were under parole supervision.

2. Probation supervision: The mean percentage of probation supervision is 20.29 while SD is 19.4.  179 (81.4%) agencies used probation supervision.  Within these agencies, 3 (1.4%) indicated all current registered sex offenders were under probation supervision.  41 (18.6%) agencies responded that none of current registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction were under parole supervision.

3. No formal supervision: The mean percentage of no formal supervision is 55.94 while SD is 31.31.  178 (84.3%) agencies used informal supervision.  Within these agencies, 8 (3.8%) indicated all current registered sex offenders were under informal supervision.  33 (18.6%) agencies responded that none of current registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction were under informal supervision.

4. Unknown supervision: The mean percentage of unknown supervision is 12.18 while SD is 29.2.  60 (29.4%) agencies used unknown supervision.  Within these agencies, 18 (8.8%) indicated all current registered sex offenders were under unknown supervision.  144 (70.6%) agencies responded that none of current registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction were under unknown supervision.

| Q10: Number of New Registrants Per Month | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=220 | N_New_Registrant | # of new registrants per month | | | | 4.96 (12.16) | 0/120 | |

Heavy data clean up: I checked individual cases containing unusually high numbers to verify the numbers. These unusual numbers appeared because the SPSS program did not recognize variables such as verbal expression (e.g. less than one converted to 0.5), range (e.g. 3-4 converted to its midpoint, 3.5), mathematical sign (e.g. <5 converted to 5). These were reviewed, verified, converted, and/or corrected. The following are the cases involved: #17, #31, #33, #51, #52, #60, #86, #113, #123, #127, #128, #134, #137, #144, #145, #167, #177, #179, and #185.

Descriptive: The mean number of new registrants per month is 4.96 while the median number is 2. The range is from 0 to 120. 49 (22.3%) agencies indicated their average new registered sex offenders were either none or less than one person. 2 (about 1%) agencies indicated over 100 new sex offenders per month. 81 (36.8%) agencies have new sex offenders at the rate of one or two persons per month. When examined new registrants by jurisdiction, the mean numbers of new registrants per month are 4.39 (local), 3.1 (county), and 26.92 (state) respectively.

| Q11: Classification System | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=217 | Classification | Classification System | 1=Conviction and History<br>2=Risk assessment<br>3=Single tier w/ special designation<br>4=Single group | 69<br>76<br>49<br>23 | 31.8%<br>35.0%<br>22.6%<br>10.6% | | | |

Data: The variable "Classification" is coded into 1=Conviction and History, 2=Risk assessment, 3=Single group, 4=Single tier w/ special designation.

Descriptive: 11 agencies did not respond with their jurisdiction's system of classifying sex offenders for registration purposes. 69 (31.8%) agencies classified registered offenders into tiers/levels based solely on conviction offense and/or offense history.    76 (35%) indicated their classification system tiers/levels were based on a risk assessment process that includes both offense based and other factors. 49 (22.6%) used a single tier, with special designations for a small group of particularly high-risk individuals (e.g. sexual predator). 23 (10.6%) handled all registered offenders as a single group in terms of establishing registration requirements.
Note: In responses to an open question, many respondents revealed that classification was normally completed by the courts, state department of corrections including parole and probation, state police, or state sex registry office. Therefore, many respondents at the local and county level indicated they simply had registered and monitored sex offenders based on state classification.

| Q13: Verification Procedure and its Frequency on Sex Offender Information | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=227 | Field_Visit | Unannounced Field Visits | | 0=27<br>1=24<br>2=35<br>3=19<br>4=122 | 11.9%<br>10.6%<br>15.4%<br>8.4%<br>53.7% | 2.81 (1.47) | | |
| N=220 | Mail_Verification | Mail Based Verification | | 0=117<br>1=35<br>2=17<br>3=5<br>4=46 | 53.2%<br>15.9%<br>7.7%<br>2.3%<br>20.9% | 1.22 (1.60) | | |
| N=222 | Address_Verificaiton | Address Verification | 0=Never<br>1=Once a year<br>2=Quarterly<br>3=Monthly<br>4=Variable | 0=65<br>1=30<br>2=24<br>3=13<br>4=90 | 29.3%<br>13.5%<br>10.8%<br>5.9%<br>40.5% | 2.15 (1.77) | 0/4 | Ordinal/<br>Scale |
| N=223 | Collateral_Interview | Collateral Contact Interviews | | 0=66<br>1=19<br>2=22<br>3=11<br>4=105 | 29.6%<br>8.5%<br>9.9%<br>4.9%<br>47.1% | 2.31 (1.77) | | |
| N=224 | In_Person | In-person Verification | | 0=13<br>1=50<br>2=44<br>3=13<br>4=104 | 5.8%<br>22.3%<br>19.6%<br>5.8%<br>46.4% | 2.65 (1.40) | | |

Data: Five variables are created in the question #13 regarding verification procedures on sex offender information: Unannounced Field Visits, Mail-based Verification, Address Verification using databases, Collateral contact interviews, and in-person verification by registered offender. Each variable was coded as 0=Never, 1=once a year, 2=quarterly, 3=monthly, or 4=variable.

Descriptive: How often does your agency utilize the following procedures to verify information on registered sex offenders within your jurisdiction?

1. Unannounced field visits: this procedure is the one of the two popular methods used by law enforcement to verify information on registered sex offenders.  the mean of the variable is 2.81. About 12% (n=27) indicated they never use a procedure of unannounced field visits.  24 (10.6%) agencies use it once a year, while 35 (15.4%) use it once a quarter.  19 (8.4%) use it on a monthly basis, while 122 (53.7%) use it irregularly.

2. Mail based verification: this procedure is the least likely used by the law enforcement agencies.  More than a half of agencies (n=117, 53.2%) indicated they never use mail based verification.  The mean of the variable is 1.22.  52 (23.6%) agencies use it once a year or once every quarter.  5 (2.3%) use it on a monthly basis while 46 (20.9%) use it irregularly.

3. Address verification: the mean of the variable is 2.15.  About 30% (n=65) indicated they never use an address verification procedure using data bases such as RMV info, banks, or utilities.  30 (13.5%) agencies use it once a year, while 24 (10.8%) use once a quarter.  13 (5.9%) use it on a monthly basis, while 90 (40.5%) use it irregularly.

4. Collateral contact interviews: the mean of the variable is 2.31.  Approximately 30% (n=26) indicated they never use collateral contact interviews and verification through employers, families, or others.  19 (8.5%) agencies use it once a year, while 22 (9.9%) use once a quarter. 11 (4.9%) use it on a monthly basis while 106 (47.1%) use it irregularly.

5. In-person verification: this procedure is also one of the popular methods used by law enforcement.  The mean of the variable is 2.65.  Only 13 agencies (5.8%) indicated they don't use the procedure of in-person verification by registered offender.  About 42% (n=94) use it to verify information on registered sex offenders once a year or quarterly.  13 (5.8%) use it on a monthly basis, while 104 (46.4%) use it irregularly.

| Q14: Monitoring Variance with Offender Risk and Management Level | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=228 | Monitoring_Variance | Monitoring Variance | 0=No | 80 | 35.1% | .65 (.48) | 0/1 | Scale |
| | | | 1=Yes | 148 | 64.9% | | | |

Data: the monitoring variance of offender risk and management level is coded as 0=No and 1=yes.

Descriptive: 148 (64.6%) agencies responded their monitoring provisions vary in accordance with offender risk or management levels.  Need to examine open questions 15 and 16 to find out in detail.

| Q17: Percentage of Non compliant | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=213 | P_Non_Compliant | % of Non Compliant | | | | 5.15 (8.73) | 0/50 | Scale |
| Q17 a: Number of Non compliant | | | | | | | | |
| N=211 | N_Non_Compliant | N of Non Compliant | Total=3310 | | | 15.69(62.45 | 0/820 | Scale |
| Q18: Percentage of Absconder or Missing status (P_A_M) | | | | | | | | |
| N=218 | P_A_M | % of Absconder or Missing | | | | 42.9 (44.1) | 0/100 | |
| Q19: Number of Absconder or Missing status (N_A_M) | | | | | | | | |
| N=213 | N_A_M | # of Absconder or Missing | Total=1335 | | | 6.27 (21.59) | 0/236 | |

Heavy data clean up: Serious validity and reliability issues.  I found many respondents did not read the questions (Q17, 18, 19) carefully.  The first question asks *percentage of non-compliant*, the second question asks *percentage of absconder or missing status among non-compliants* while the third question asks *number of absconder or missing status*. For example, many respondents simply put the same number for all three questions, such as 2, 2, 2 or 5, 5, 5.  I had to look at the actual number of sex offenders (Question #7) to examine and verify each value.  Then, I recalculated each item reflecting the questions.  For example of 2, 2, 2 values in a case of the total 200 current sex offenders, I first considered the value "2" in the number of absconders (Q 19) as a face value. Then, the value "2" in the percentage of absconders (Q18) is converted to 1% (2 out of 200). Finally, the value "2" in the percentage of absconders among the non-compliant is converted to 100% (2 out of 2).

In addition, verbal expressions (e.g. less than one converted to 0.5), ranges (e.g. 3-4 converted to its midpoint, 3.5), and mathematical signs (e.g. <5 converted to 5) are reviewed, verified, converted, and/or corrected.  Moreover, many mixed up the proportion (0.05), the ratio (1/20), and percentage (5%).  I had to convert them into percentage format for consistency.

Descriptive:
1.  Percentage of Non-Compliant: The mean of the variable is 5.04.  15 agencies did not answer the question (missing values).  62 (29.1%) agencies indicated all registered sex offenders in their jurisdiction complied with their requirements, therefore 0 non-compliant.  Approximately 50% of participating agencies (n=103, 48.4%) had less than 5% currently non-compliant of their registered sex offenders.  4 (1.9%) extreme cases where 48-50% of their sex offenders were non-compliant had small numbers of sex offenders, like 2 or 10 or 25 sex offenders, in their jurisdiction.

a. * Please note that # of Non-Compliant variable was created based on total number of sex offenders divided by percentage of Non-Compliant. The total number of non compliants is 3,310. This is approximately 3.72% of the total number of registered sex offenders in the sample data set. When this percentage applies to the current registered sex offenders in the U.S., the estimate non complaints are 27,523. The mean of the variable is 15.69. Nine agencies (4.5%) indicated they have more than 100 non-compliants. One of them had 820 non-compliants in its jurisdiction.

2. Percentage of Absconders or Missing Status: the mean of the variable is 43.1. There were 10 (4.4%) missing values. 81 (37.2%) agencies reported there was no absconder or missing status among the non-compliant in their jurisdiction. 67 (30.7%)[3] indicated all their non-compliant were either absconder or missing status.

3. Number of Absconder or Missing Status: the total number of absconder or missing sex offenders is 1335. Surprisingly, this is approximately 40.3% of the total number of non compliants in this sample data. When this percentage applies to the estimated non complaints in the U.S., the estimated absconders are 11,091. The mean of the variable is 6.27. There were 15 (6.6%) missing values. 86 (40.4%) agencies reported they do not have any absconders or missing status currently. Approximately 50% (n=106, 49.7%) had currently less than 10 absconders or missing status. Two extreme cases had more than 100 absconders or missing status (120 and 236 each), consisting of 1% of responders.

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[3] Further analysis required

| Q20: Factors Contributing to Registration Non-Compliance (NCF) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=221 | NCF_Indifference | Indifference to requirements | 0=Rare<br>1=Fairly rare<br>2=Occasionally<br>3=Fairly common<br>4=Very common | 0=43<br>1=33<br>2=70<br>3=49<br>4=26 | 19.5%<br>14.9%<br>31.7%<br>22.2%<br>11.8% | 1.92 (1.27) | | |
| N=225 | NCF_L_U | Lack of understanding | | 0=47<br>1=65<br>2=73<br>3=30<br>4=10 | 20.9%<br>28.9%<br>32.4%<br>13.3%<br>4.4% | 1.52 (1.1) | | |
| N=224 | NCF_Unintentional | Unintentional oversight | | 0=57<br>1=49<br>2=79<br>3=33<br>4=7 | 25.3%<br>21.8%<br>35.1%<br>14.7%<br>3.1% | 1.48 (1.12) | 0/4 | Ordinal |
| N=225 | NCF_Rebellion | Rebellion to requirements | | 0=55<br>1=46<br>2=58<br>3=38<br>4=28 | 24.4%<br>20.4%<br>25.8%<br>16.9%<br>12.4% | 1.72 (1.33) | | |
| N=223 | NCF_D_A | Detection avoidance | | 0=50<br>1=49<br>2=67<br>3=25<br>4=32 | 22.4%<br>22.0%<br>30.0%<br>11.2%<br>14.3% | 1.73 (1.32) | | |

Data: Five basic questions combined into matrix questions creating five variables on contributing factors to registration non-compliance. Each variable was coded as 0=Rare, 1=Fairly rare, 2=Occasionally, 3=Fairly common, or 4=Very common.

Descriptive:

1. Indifference to requirements: the mean of the variable is 1.92. 75 (34%) reported that this was either a fairly or very common factor for non-compliance among sex offenders, while 43 (19.4%) reported "indifference to requirements" as a rarely used contributing factor of non-compliance among sex offenders.

2. Lack of understanding: the mean of the variable is 1.52. 40 (17.7%) agencies reported "lack of understanding" as a fairly or very common factor for non-compliance among sex offenders.

3. Unintentional oversight: the mean of the variable is 1.48. 40 (17.8%) agencies reported "unintentional oversight" as a fairly or very common factor for non-compliance among sex offenders.

4. Rebellion against requirements: the mean of the variable is 1.72. 66 (29.3%) agencies reported "rebellion against requirements" as a fairly or very common factor in non-compliance among sex offenders.

5. Detection avoidance: the mean of the variable is 1.73. 57 (25.5%) agencies indicated that "detection avoidance" is a fairly or very common factor in non-compliance among sex offenders.

| Q21: Scenarios to Registration Non-Compliant (NCS) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=228 | NCS_Stop_Report | Just stop reporting | 0=Never<br>1=Rarely<br>2=Occasionally<br>3=Fairly often<br>4=Very often | 0=29<br>1=73<br>2=69<br>3=46<br>4=11 | 12.7%<br>32.0%<br>30.3%<br>20.2%<br>4.8% | 1.72 (1.07) | 0/4 | Ordinal/<br>Scale |
| | NCS_Local | Local relocation | | 0=23<br>1=56<br>2=70<br>3=69<br>4=10 | 10.1%<br>24.6%<br>30.7%<br>30.3%<br>4.4% | 1.94 (1.06) | | |
| | NCS_InState | In State relocation | | 0=16<br>1=42<br>2=61<br>3=96<br>4=13 | 7%<br>18.4%<br>26.8%<br>42.1%<br>5.7% | 2.21 (1.04) | | |
| | NCS_OutState | Out of state relocation | | 0=26<br>1=52<br>2=80<br>3=58<br>4=12 | 11.4%<br>22.8%<br>35.1%<br>25.4%<br>5.3% | 1.9 (1.07) | | |
| | NCS_OutCountry | Out of country relocation | | 0=98<br>1=82<br>2=32<br>3=14<br>4=2 | 43.0%<br>36.0%<br>14.0%<br>6.1%<br>.9% | .86 (.94) | | |
| | NCS_ID_Theft | ID theft | | 0=109<br>1=91<br>2=22<br>3=5<br>4=1 | 47.8%<br>39.9%<br>9.6%<br>2.2%<br>.4% | .68 (.78) | | |
| | NCS_ID_Manipulate | ID manipulation | | 0=85<br>1=85<br>2=41<br>3=15<br>4=2 | 37.3%<br>37.3%<br>18.0%<br>6.6%<br>.9% | .96 (.95) | | |

<u>Data</u>: Seven basic questions combined into matrix questions creating seven variables on scenarios among individuals who fail to report or update their information. Each variable was coded as 0=Never, 1=Rare, 2=Occasionally, 3=Fairly often, or 4=Very often.

<u>Descriptive</u>:
1. Just stop reporting: In this scenario, we asked how common the following was: the registrant has done little to avoid detection, remains at the registered location, and just stops reporting.  The mean of the variable is 1.72.  While 29 (12.7%) respondents had never experienced the scenario that registered sex offenders just stop reporting, 57 (25%) reported they experienced it either fairly or very often.

2. Local relocation: in this scenario, we asked how common the following was: the registrant has moved to a new location within the same locality and stops reporting.  The mean of the variable is 1.94.  23 (10.1%) respondents had never experienced the scenario "local relocation and just stop reporting."  79 (34.7%) reported they experienced this either fairly or very often.

3. In-state relocation: in this scenario, we asked how common the following was: the registrant has moved to a new location outside of the jurisdiction but within the state.  The mean of the variable is 2.21.  While 16 (7%) of respondents had never experienced the scenario "in-state relocation and fail to report," large number of agencies (n=109, 47.8%) reported they experienced this scenario either fairly or very often.

4. Out of state relocation: in this scenario, we asked how common it was that a registrant has moved to another state and failed to report.  The mean of the variable is 1.9.  26 (11.4%) respondents had never experienced the scenario "out of state relocation and fail to report."  70 (30.7%) reported they experienced this either fairly or very often.

5. Out of country relocation: in this scenario, we asked how common it is that the registrant has left the country.  The mean of the variable is .86.  98 (43%) respondents had never experienced the scenario "out of country relocation and fail to report."  16 (7%) reported they experienced this either fairly or very often.

6. ID theft: in this scenario, we asked how common it was for a registrant to attempt to conceal his identity using identity theft (i.e. assumes new identity).  The mean of the variable is .68.  109 (47.8%) respondents had never experienced the scenario "ID theft to conceal identity."  Although only 6 (2.6%) reported they experienced this either fairly or very often, 22 agencies (9.6%) also reported they experienced it occasionally.   Thus, 12.2% of the agencies experienced it from moderate to serious range.

7. ID manipulation: in this scenario, we asked how common it is that a registrant has attempted to conceal his identity by using an alias. The mean of the variable is .96. 85 (37.3%) respondents had never experienced the scenario "ID manipulation." 17 (7.5%) reported they experienced this scenario either fairly or very often. 41 (18%) also reported they experienced it occasionally. Therefore, 58 (25.5%) experienced it from moderate to serious range.

| Q22: Yes/No Awareness of ID Manipulation | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=228 | Y_N_ID_Manipulate | Awareness of ID Manipulation | 0=No 1=Yes | 53 | 23.2% | .23 (.42) | 0/1 | |
| Q23: Proportion of ID Manipulation | | | | | | | | |
| N=52 | P_ID_Manipulate | % of ID Manipulation | | | | 5.19(7.73) | 1/40 | |
| Q25: Yes/No Awareness of ID Theft | | | | | | | | |
| N=228 | Y_N_ID_Theft | Awareness of ID Theft | 0=No 1=Yes | 11 | 4.8% | .05 (.22) | 0/1 | |
| Q26: Number of ID Theft | | | | | | | | |
| N=11 | N_ID_Theft | # of ID Theft | | | | 2.73 (3.32) | 1/12 | |

Data: Variables regarding awareness of ID Manipulation or ID Theft are coded as 0=No and 1=Yes. Questions #23 (Proportion of ID Manipulation) and #26 (Number of ID Theft) confused some respondents because we asked proportion for one and numbers for the other, and many answered numbers instead of proportion or vice versa.

Descriptive:
1. Awareness of ID Manipulation: 53 (23.1%) respondents were aware of cases in which registrants in their jurisdiction used identity manipulation (e.g. aliases) specifically to avoid detection by authorities.

2. Percentage of ID Manipulation: the mean of the variable is 5.19. 22 out of 52 (42.3%) reported that about 1% of registered sex offenders used identity manipulation to avoid detection. 21 (40.4%) respondents indicated their ID manipulation cases ranged from 1% and 5% of their total of registered sex offenders.

3. Awareness of ID Theft: Only 11 (4.8%) respondents were aware of cases in which registrants in their jurisdiction have used identity theft (e.g. stealing and assuming the identity of another individual) specifically to avoid detection by authorities.

4. Number of ID Theft: the mean of the variable is 2.73 ranging from one case to 12 cases. 6 out of 11 (54.5%) respondents had worked only one case in which a sex offender committed identity theft and assumed a new identity. One respondent revealed s/he had worked 12 identity theft cases committed by sex offenders.

Please see the analysis of open questions on ID manipulation and theft.

| Q28: Percentage of Non Compliant Tracking Down Timeframe (P_NCT) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=211 | P_NCT_Day | % Located within One Day | | | 16.54(27.96) | |
| | P_NCT_Week | % Located within One Week | | | 28.00 (31.95) | |
| | P_NCT_Month | % Located within One Month | | | 24.53 (29.90) | |
| | P_NCT_3Month | % Located within Three Months | | | 8.89 (17.91) | |
| | P_NCT_6Month | % Located within Six Months | | | 7.75 (16.59) | |
| | P_NCT_Year | % Located within One Year | | | 8.32 (16.80) | |
| | P_No_NCT_Year | % Not Located within One Year | | | 6.35 (15.79) | |

Data: Seven variables are created in the question #28 using matrix questions. Each variable asks percentage of locating non-compliant registrants within one day, one week, one month, three months, six months, one year, and not located within the first year.

Descriptive:
In average of 211 agencies, 16% of non complaints were located within one day, 28% in one week, 25% in one month, 8.9% in three months, 7.6% in six months, and 8.3% within one year. About 6.4% were not located within a year. 100 agencies (47.4%) indicated they have missing registrants ranging 1% to 100% more than a year.

| Q29: Percentage of Absconders or Missing Status Apprehension Timeframe (P_AMAT) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=189 | P_AMAT_Week | % Apprehended within 1 Week | | | 20.63 (32.66) | |
| | P_AMAT_Month | % Apprehended within 1 Month | | | 20.08 (28.74) | |
| | P_AMAT_3Month | % Apprehended within 3 Months | | | 12.12 (21.84) | |
| | P_AMAT_6Month | % Apprehended within 6 Months | | | 12.68 (22.34) | |
| | P_AMAT_Year | % Apprehended within 1 Year | | | 18.52 (29.53) | |
| | P_No_AMAT_Year | % Not Apprehended within 1 Yr | | | 15.98 (27.86) | |

Data: six variables are created in the question #29 using matrix questions.  Each variable asks percentage of locating those offenders who are officially designated as absconders or missing sex offenders within one week, one month, three months, six months, one year, and not located within the first year.

Descriptive:
1.  In average of 189 agencies, about 21% of absconders or missing registrants were located within one week, another 20% of absconders in one month, 12% in three months, another 12% in six months, and 18.5% within one year.  About 16% were not located within a year.  112 agencies (47.4%) indicated they have absconders or missing registrants ranging 1% to 100% more than a year.

| Q30: Resources to locate and apprehend missing registrants: How frequently does your jurisdiction utilize the following resources to locate and apprehend missing registrants? | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=224 N=221 N=222 N=221 | R_Apprend_Unit | Special Apprehension Unit | | 0=53 1=57 2=55 3=21 4=38 | 23.7% 25.4% 24.6% 9.4% 17.0% | 1.71 (1.38) |
| | R_Interstate_Comp | Interstate Compact | 0=Never 1=Rarely 2=Occasional 3=Somewhat frequently 4=Very frequently | 0=75 1=73 2=45 3=15 4=13 | 33.9% 33.0% 20.4% 6.8% 5.9% | 1.18 (1.45) |
| | R_US_Marshall | US Marshall | | 0=61 1=67 2=48 3=22 4=24 | 27.5% 30.2% 21.6% 9.9% 10.8% | 1.46 (1.29) |
| | R_NCMEC | Nat'l Center Missing and Exploited | | 0=101 1=70 2=36 3=7 4=7 | 45.7% 31.7% 16.3% 3.2% 3.2% | .86 (1.01) |

Data: Four variables are created in the matrix question #30 regarding the use of sources in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders.  They are Specialized Apprehension Unit, Interstate Compact, US Marshalls, and National

Center for Missing and Exploited Children.  Each variable was coded as 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Occasionally, 3=Somewhat frequently, 4=Very frequently.

Descriptive:

1. Specialized apprehension units: the mean of the variable is 1.71. Almost a half of agencies (n=110, 49.1%) indicated they rarely or never used a specialized apprehension unit to locate and apprehend missing registrants.  55 (24.6%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 59 (26.4%) used it either somewhat or very frequently.

2. Interstate Compacts: the mean of the variable is 1.18. 148 (66.9%) indicated they rarely or never used interstate compacts.  45 (20.4%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 28 (12.7%) used it either somewhat or very frequently.

3. US Marshall's Service: the mean of the variable is 1.46. Almost 58 % (n=128, 57.7%) indicated they rarely or never used US Marshall's Service.  45 (20.4%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 28 (12.7%) used it either somewhat or very frequently.

4. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children: the mean of the variable is .86. More than 75% (n=171, 77.4%) indicated they rarely or never used the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.  36 (16.3%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 14 (6.4%) used it either somewhat or very frequently.

| Q31: Data Technology Approaches to Locate and Apprehend Missing Registrants (DT=Data Technology) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=228 | DT_RMV_File | Driver License/RMV File | 0=Rarely or never used<br>1=Used occasionally<br>2=Used frequently<br>3=Used in all cases | 0=12<br>1=33<br>2=71<br>3=112 | 5.3%<br>14.5%<br>31.1%<br>49.1% | 2.24 (.89) | |
| | DT_Crim_History | State/ Federal Criminal History | | 0=11<br>1=25<br>2=71<br>3=121 | 4.8%<br>11.0%<br>31.1%<br>53.1% | 2.32 (.86) | |
| | DT_SS_System | Social Security Record | | 0=100<br>1=73<br>2=37<br>3=18 | 43.9%<br>32.0%<br>16.2%<br>7.9% | .88 (.95) | |
| | DT_LexusNexis | Commercial Databases | | 0=79<br>1=64<br>2=52<br>3=33 | 34.6%<br>28.1%<br>22.8%<br>14.5% | 1.17 (1.06) | |
| | DT_Property_Rec | Property or Mortgage Records | | 0=69<br>1=98<br>2=44<br>3=17 | 30.3%<br>43.0%<br>19.3%<br>7.5% | 1.04 (.89) | |
| | DT_Phone_Rec | Phone Records | | 0=63<br>1=91<br>2=53<br>3=21 | 27.6%<br>39.9%<br>23.2%<br>9.2% | 1.14 (.93) | |
| | DT_Internet_Rec | Internet Records such as email | | 0=57<br>1=86<br>2=63<br>3=22 | 25.0%<br>37.7%<br>27.6%<br>9.6% | 1.22 (.93) | 0/3 |
| | DT_Traffic_Rec | Traffic Violation Registries | | 0=47<br>1=68<br>2=74<br>3=39 | 20.6%<br>29.8%<br>32.5%<br>17.1% | 1.46 (1.0) | |
| | DT_Firearm_Lic | Firearm License Databases | | 0=132<br>1=68<br>2=21 | 57.9%<br>29.8%<br>9.2% | .57 (.79) | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 3=7 | 3.1% | |
| DT_Civil_Court_R | Civil Court Records | | 0=74 | 32.5% | 1.08 (.97) |
| | | | 1=86 | 37.7% | |
| | | | 2=43 | 18.9% | |
| | | | 3=25 | 11.0% | |
| DT_Credit_Rec | Credit Card Records | | 0=135 | 59.2% | .55 (.77) |
| | | | 1=68 | 29.8% | |
| | | | 2=18 | 7.9% | |
| | | | 3=7 | 3.1% | |
| DT_Bank_Rec | Bank Records | | 0=139 | 61.0% | .51 (.74) |
| | | | 1=68 | 29.8% | |
| | | | 2=15 | 6.6% | |
| | | | 3=6 | 2.6% | |
| DT_Biometrics | Biometrics such as Fingerprints | | 0=103 | 45.2% | .87 (. 99) |
| | | | 1=68 | 29.8% | |
| | | | 2=36 | 15.8% | |
| | | | 3=21 | 9.2% | |

Data: Thirteen variables are created in the matrix question #31 regarding the use of data technology approaches in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders.  They are Drivers license/RMV data file, State or federal criminal history system, Social security record systems, Commercial databases such as LexusNexis, Local property or mortgage records, Phone records, Internet records (email databases, social networking), Traffic violation registries, Firearm license databases, Civil court records (probate, family court, etc), Credit card records, Bank records, and Biometrics (fingerprints, etc).  Each variable was coded as 0=Rarely or never used, 1=Used occasionally, 2=Used frequently, or 3=Used in all cases.

Descriptive:
1. Drivers license/RMV data file: the mean of the variable is 2.24. 12 (5.3%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of drivers license/RMV data files.  33 (14.5%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 71 (31.1%) used it frequently.  About a half of agencies (n=112, 49.1%) reported they used it in all cases.

2. State/Federal criminal history systems: the mean of the variable is 2.32. 11 (4.8%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of state/federal criminal history systems.  25 (11.0%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 71 (31.1%) used it frequently.  More than a half of agencies (n=121, 53.1%) used it in all cases.

3. Social security record systems: the mean of the variable is .88.  About 44% (n=100, 43.9%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of social security record systems.  73 (32%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 37 (16.2%) used it frequently.  Only 18 (7.9%) used it in all cases.

4. Commercial databases such as Lexus Nexis: the mean of the variable is 1.17. About 35% (n=77, 34.6%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of commercial databases such as Lexus Nexis.  64 (28.1%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 52 (22.8%) used it frequently.  33 (14.5%) used it in all cases

5. Property or mortgage records: the mean of the variable is 1.04.  About 30% (n=69, 30.3%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of property or mortgage records.  98 (43%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 44 (19.3%) used it frequently.  Only 17 (7.5%) used it in all cases.

6. Phone records: the mean of the variable is 1.14. 63 (27.6%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of phone records.  91 (39.9%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 53 (23.2%) used it frequently.  21 (9.2%) reported they used it in all cases.

7. Internet records (Email databases, social networking): the mean of the variable is 1.22. 57 (25%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of internet records such as email databases or social networking.  86 (37.7%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 63 (27.6%) used it frequently.  22 (9.6%) used it in all cases.

8. Traffic violation registries: the mean of the variable is 1.46.  About 21% (n=47, 20.6%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of traffic violation registries.  68 (29.8%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 74 (32.5%) used it frequently.  39 (17.1%) used it in all cases.

9. Firearm license databases: the mean of the variable is .57. More than a half of agencies (n=132, 57.9%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of firearm license databases.  68 (29.8%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 21 (9.2%) used it frequently.  Only 7 (3.1%) reported they used it in all cases.

10. Civil court records (probate, family court, etc): the mean of the variable is 1.08.  About 33 % (n=74, 32.5%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of civil court records.  86 (37.7%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 43 (18.9%) used it frequently.  25 (11%) used it in all cases.

11. Credit card records: the mean of the variable is .55. Almost 60% (n=135, 59.2%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of credit card records.  68 (29.8%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 18 (7.9%) used it frequently.  Only 7 (3.1%) reported they used it in all cases.

12. Bank records: the mean of the variable is .51. More than 60% (n=139, 61%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of bank records.  68 (29.8%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 15 (6.6%) used it frequently.  Only 6 (2.6%) used it in all cases.

13. Biometrics such as fingerprints: the mean of the variable is .87. 103 (45.2%) indicated they rarely or never used a data technology of biometrics such as fingerprints.  68 (29.8%) agencies used it once occasionally, while 36 (15.8%) used it frequently.  21 (9.2%) used it in all cases.

| Q32: Three Most Effective Data Technology Sources | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=220 | Effective_DT_#1 | Effective Technology Source #1 | Three effective data technology | Drivers license/RMV data file<br>Criminal history systems<br>Commercial databases | 113<br>52<br>23 | 51.4%<br>23.6%<br>10.5% |
| N=217 | Effective_DT_#2 | Effective Technology Source #2 | | Criminal history systems<br>Drivers license/RMV data file<br>Commercial databases | 84<br>44<br>18 | 38.7%<br>20.3%<br>8.3% |
| N=217 | Effective_DT_#3 | Effective Technology Source #3 | | Commercial databases<br>Traffic violation<br>Internet records | 33<br>31<br>30 | 15.2%<br>14.3%<br>13.8% |

Data: Three basic questions combined into matrix questions creating three variables on the most effective data technology in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders.  In each variable, respondents were given to choose the three most effective data technology approaches.

Descriptive:

1. Effective technology source #1: in the first choice of three most effective technology, about a half of respondents (n=113, 51.4%) indicated drivers license/RMV data file is the most effective data technology followed by criminal history systems (n=52, 23.6 %), and commercial databases such as Nexus Lexis (n=23, 10.5%)

2. Effective technology source #2: in the second choice of three most effective technology, 84 (38.7%) indicated criminal history systems is the most effective data technology followed by drivers license/RMV data file (n=44, 20.3%), and commercial databases such as Nexus Lexis (n=18, 8.3%)

3. Effective technology source #3: in the third choice of three most effective technology, 33(15.2%) indicated commercial databases is the most effective data technology followed by traffic violation (n=31, 14.3%), and internet records (n=30, 13.8%)

| Q34: Contact Based Approaches to Locate and Apprehend Missing Registrants (CB=Contact Based) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=222 | CB_LKA_Visit | Last Known Address Visit | 0=Rarely or never used<br>1=Used occasionally<br>2=Used frequently<br>3=Used in all cases | 0=8<br>1=4<br>2=53<br>3=157 | 3.6%<br>1.8%<br>23.9%<br>70.7% | 2.62 (.70) | | |
| N=222 | CB_N_Interview | Neighbor Interview | | 0=11<br>1=32<br>2=101<br>3=78 | 5.0%<br>14.4%<br>45.5%<br>35.1% | 2.11 (.83) | | |
| N=222 | CB_F_Interview | Family Interview | | 0=12<br>1=31<br>2=98<br>3=81 | 5.4%<br>14.0%<br>44.1%<br>36.5% | 2.12 (.84) | | |
| N=222 | CB_E_Interview | Employer Interview | | 0=17<br>1=49<br>2=91<br>3=65 | 7.7%<br>22.1%<br>41.0%<br>29.3% | 1.92 (.90) | | |
| N=221 | CB_O_I_Interview | Other Key Informant Interview | | 0=28<br>1=67<br>2=79<br>3=47 | 12.7%<br>30.3%<br>35.7%<br>21.3% | 1.66 (.95) | | |
| N=222 | CB_P_P_Consult | Probation/Parole Consultation | | 0=9<br>1=26<br>2=90<br>3=97 | 4.1%<br>11.7%<br>40.5%<br>43.7% | 2.24 (.81) | | |
| N=221 | CB_T_P_Interview | Treatment Provider Interview | | 0=95<br>1=63<br>2=40<br>3=23 | 43.0%<br>28.5%<br>18.1%<br>10.4% | .96 (1.02) | | |
| N=221 | CB_V_Interview | Victim Interview | | 0=115<br>1=69<br>2=24<br>3=13 | 52.0%<br>31.2%<br>10.9%<br>5.9% | .71 (.88) | | |

Data: Eight variables are created in the matrix question #34 regarding the use of contact based approaches in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders.  They are Last known address visit, neighbor interview, family interview, employer interview, other key informant interview, probation/parole consultation, treatment provider interview, and victim interview.  Each variable was coded as 0=Rarely or never used, 1=Used occasionally, 2=Used frequently, or 3=Used in all cases.

Descriptive:

1.  Last known address visit: the mean of the variable is 2.62. The contact based approach of the last known address visit is the most widely used tool among the agencies.  Over 70% (n=157, 70.7%) of agencies reported that they used it in all cases.  8 (3.6%) indicated they rarely or never used it.  4 (1.8%) agencies used it occasionally, while 53 (23.9%) used it frequently.

2.  Neighbor interview: the mean of the variable is 2.1. 11 (5%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of neighbor interview.  32 (14.4%) agencies used it occasionally, while 101 (45.5%) used it frequently.  75 (35.1%) used it in all cases.

3.  Family interview: the mean of the variable is 2.12. 12 (5.4%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of family interview.  31 (14%) agencies used it occasionally, while 98 (44.1%) used it frequently.  81 (36.5%) used it in all cases.

4.  Employer interview: the mean of the variable is 1.92. 17 (7.7%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of employer interview.  49 (22.1%) agencies used it occasionally, while 91 (41%) used it frequently.  65 (28.5%) used it in all cases

5.  Other key informant interview: the mean of the variable is 1.66. 28 (12.7%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of other key informant interview.  67 (30.3%) agencies used it occasionally, while 79 (35.7%) used it frequently.  47 (21.3%) used it in all cases.

6.  Probation/Parole consultation: the mean of the variable is 2.24. 9 (4.1%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of probation/parole consultation while almost 85% (n=187, 84.2%) used it frequently or all the time.  26 (11.7%) agencies used it occasionally.

7. Treatment provider interview: the mean of the variable is .96. 95 (43%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of treatment provider interview.  63 (28.5%) agencies used it occasionally, while 40 (18.1%) used it frequently.  23 (10.4%) used it in all cases.

8. Victim interview: the mean of the variable is .71. More than 50% (n=115, 52%) indicated they rarely or never used a contact based approach of victim interview.  69 (31.2%) agencies used it occasionally, while 24 (10.9%) used it frequently.  13 (5.9%) used it in all cases.

| Q35: Three Most Effective Contact Based Approaches | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=219 | Effective_CB_#1 | Effective Contact Approach #1 | Three effective contact based approach | Last known address visits<br>Family interviews<br>Neighbor interviews | 124<br>42<br>30 | 56.6%<br>19.2%<br>13.7% | |
| N=216 | Effective_CB_#2 | Effective Contact Approach #2 | | Neighbor interviews<br>Family interviews<br>Probation/parole consultation | 71<br>46<br>35 | 32.9%<br>21.3%<br>16.2% | |
| N=214 | Effective_CB_#3 | Effective Contact Approach #3 | | Family interviews<br>Probation/parole consultation<br>Employer interviews | 52<br>46<br>38 | 24.3%<br>21.5%<br>17.6% | |

Data: Three basic questions combined into matrix questions creating three variables on the most effective contact based approaches in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders.  In each variable, respondents were given to choose the three most effective contact based approaches.

Descriptive:
1. Effective contact based approach #1: in the first choice of three most effective contact based approaches, more than a half of respondents (n=124, 56.6%) indicated last known address visit is the most effective contact based approach followed by family interviews (n=42, 19.2%), and neighbor interviews (n=30, 13.7%)

2.  Effective contact based approach #2: in the second choice of three most effective contact based approaches, 71 (32.9%) indicated neighbor interview is the most effective contact based approach followed by family interview (n=46, 21.3%), and probation/parole consultation (n=35, 16.2%)

3. Effective contact based approach #3: in the third choice of three most effective contact based approaches, 52 (24.3%) indicated family interview is the most effective contact based approach followed by probation/parole consultation (n=46, 21.5%), and employer interviews (n=38, 17.6%)

| Q36: Proportion of Data Technology and Contact Based Approaches to Locate and Apprehend Missing Registrants | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N=211 | Proportion_DT_CB | Ratio of Technology and Contact | Contact-based strategies alone | 19 | 9.0% |
| | | | Equal use of contact and data technology approaches | 102 | 48.3% |
| | | | Primarily contact-based, with some data technology | 63 | 29.9% |
| | | | Primarily data technology-based, with some contact | 27 | 12.8% |
| | | | Data technology-based approaches alone | 0 | 0% |

Data: There are fifteen missing cases. Respondents were asked to choose proportion of technology and contact based strategies.

Descriptive:
19 (9%) agencies responded they used contact-based strategies alone in the tracking and apprehension of missing sex offenders. About a half of agencies (n=102, 48.3%) indicated equal use of contact and data technology approaches. 63 (29.9%) responded they used primarily contact-based approaches with some data technology support. 27 (12.8%) indicated they used primarily data technology-based approaches with some contact based support. Interestingly, none of agencies responded they used data technology based approaches alon

# Appendix B

## About ID Analytics and Its ID Network

ID Analytics' corporate ID Network is a compilation of more than a billion identity risk events.  These are events for which there is the potential of an identity fraud, and these events consist of primarily applications for:

- Credit cards
- Cell phones
- Retail credit (e.g., JC Penny, Nordstrom's, Target)
- Auto loans
- Payday loans

ID Analytics does not see all of the U.S. applications for these products, but it does see roughly one-third to one-half of all these applications in the United States.  It sees most of these events in real time as the applications are sent to us via web calls for real time risk scores.  It receives these events generally as the application is being processed, as the customer is waiting, and ID Analytics scores it for either fraud or credit risk and returns the score in less than one second to the requesting business.

Surrounding this unique, cross-industry real-time scoring system, ID Analytics has built a similarly unique real-time alerting system. ID Analytics has independently enrolled more than 5 million consumers in various consumer-facing identity protection services, such as Lifelock.  ID Analytics is the backbone service to six of the eight largest providers of these identity protection services, and ID Analytics is the only company that offers this real-time alerting capability.

The alerting service operates in this manner:  As ID Analytics scores the ~million-per-day events that it routinely receives in its commercial scoring process described above, where it delivers back to a business one of these risk scores in under a second, ID Analytics then asks if that application contains any personal identifying information (PII, such as name, SSN, address) that is associated with any of the ~5 million enrolled consumers in ID Analytics' identity protection service.  If the application is associated with an enrolled consumer, then ID Analytics then sends this consumer an alert saying that we've just seen an event that uses the enrolled consumer's PII and "is this you?"  ID Analytics does this via a previously enrolled channel, mostly e-mail or text message/SMS.  If this consumer is standing at a retail counter filling out an application and receives an alert, he is assured and just ignores the alert, knowing that it is indeed him doing the application.  If he is at home or otherwise not doing an application, he can

immediately respond with the message "Not Me", and the application is shut down quickly. This out-of-band, real-time Not-Me alerting service is unique to ID Analytics.

For engagement with law enforcement, ID Analytics wants to use this unique real-time alerting service to alert—not the consumer—but law enforcement if it observes a registrant applying for a product or service using PII that is different from what is registered. In this study, ID Analytics focused on a registrant using an address different from that which is registered.

# Appendix C

## Description of Variables Used to Locate "Lost" Offenders

| Variable Name | Variable Definition |
|---|---|
| Person Number | As defined by y and used on the downloaded Florida registration data |
| Registered Address | The address in the Florida registration data file at the time the application was seen in the ID Network (at the time of the alert) |
| Registered Zip5 | The 5-digit zip code of the registrant at the time of the alert |
| Application Date | The date when ID Analytics observed the registrant submit an application to an enterprise covered by its real-time ID Network visibility. The format is YYYYMMDD |
| Application Address | The address as submitted by the registrant on the product address |
| Application Zip5 | The 5-digit zip code submitted by the registrant in the application |
| Application State | The state of the product application |
| Address Match Score | A measure of how close the two addresses (registration and application) are. Address is separated into four components: street number, street name, secondary unit designator (e.g., unit, apt), and zip code. The address match score represents how many of these four address components match between the two addressed being compared |
| Application Type | A code designating the type of industry to which the registrant submitted an application: 0 = check orders/small merchant account, 2 = credit card, 3 = cell phone, 4 = retail store, 7 = auto loan, 8 = payday loan |
| SSN4 | The last 4 digits of the registrants SSN as seen in the ID Network. This field is |

blanked out in this report, but it is visible and correct in the ID Analytics dataset